




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John Carter Brown.



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by John Dickinson

LETTERS

FROM A

FARMER

JOHN CARTER BROWN
IN

PENNSYLVANIA

TO THE


INHABITANTS

OF THE

British Colonies.

New-York: re-printed by JOHN
HOLT, near the Exchange. 1768.

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LETTERS, &c.

LETTER I.

Beloved Countrymen,

I AM a Farmer settled after a variety of fortunes, near the banks of the river Delaware, in the province of Pennsylvania. I received a liberal education and have been engaged in the busy scenes of life: but am now convinced, that a man may be as happy without bustle as with it. My farm is small; my servants are few, and good; I have a little money at interest; I wish for no more; my employment in my own affairs is easy; and with a contented grateful mind, I am completing the number of days allotted to me by divine goodness.

Being master of my time, I spend a good deal of it in a library, which I think the most valuable part of my small estate; and being acquainted with two or three gentlemen of abilities and learning, who honour me with their friendship, I believe, I have acquired a greater share of knowledge in history, and the laws and constitution of my country, than is generally attained by men of my class, many of them not being so fortunate as I have been in the opportunities of getting information.

From, infancy I was taught to love humanity and liberty. Inquiry and experience have since confirmed my reverence for the lessons then given me,

me, by convincing me more fully of their truth and excellence. Benevolence towards mankind excites wishes for their welfare, and such wishes endear the means of fulfilling them. Those can be found in liberty alone, and therefore her sacred cause ought to be espoused by every man, on every occasion, to the utmost of his power. As a charitable but poor person does not withhold his *mite*, because he cannot relieve *all* the distressed of the miserable, so let not any honest man suppress his sentiments concerning freedom, however small their influence is likely to be. Perhaps he may (a) "touch some wheel" that will have an effect greater than he expects.

These being my sentiments, I am encouraged to offer to you, my countrymen, my thoughts on some late transactions, that in my opinion are of the utmost importance to you. Conscious of my defects, I have waited some time in expectation of seeing the subject treated by persons much better qualified for the task; but being therein disappointed, and apprehensive that longer delays will be injurious, I venture at length to request the attention of the publick, praying only for one thing,—that is, that these lines may be *read* with the same zeal for the happiness of British America, with which they were *wrote*.

With a good deal of surprise I have observed that little notice has been taken of an act of parliament, as injurious in its principle to the liberties of these colonies as the Stamp-Act was: I mean the act for suspending the legislation of New-York.

The assembly of that government complied with a former act of parliament, requiring certain provisions

visions to be made for the troops in America, in every particular I think except the articles of salt, pepper and vinegar, In my opinion they acted imprudently considering all circumstances in not complying so far as would give satisfaction, as several colonies did: But my dislike of their conduct in that instance, has not blinded me so much, that I cannot plainly perceive, that they have been punished in a manner pernicious to American freedom, and justly alarming to all the colonies.

If the British parliament has a legal authority to order, that we shall furnish a single article for the troops here, and to compel obedience to that order; they have the same right to order us to supply those troops with arms, clothes, and every necessary, and to compel obedience to *that* order also; in short, to lay *any burdens* they please upon us. What is this but *taxing* us at a *certain sum*, and leaving to us only the *manner* of raising it? How is this mode more tolerable than the *Stamp-Act*? Would that act have appeared more pleasing to Americans if being ordered thereby to raise the sum total of the taxes, the mighty privilege had been left to them, of saying how much should be paid for an instrument of writing on paper and how much for another on parchment?

An act of parliament commanding us to do a certain thing, if it has any validity, is a tax upon us for the expence that accrues in complying with it, and for this reason, I believe, every colony on the continent, that choose to give a mark of their respect for Great-Britain, in complying with the act relating to the troops, cautiously avoided the mention of that act. lest their conduct should be attributed to its supposed obligation.

The matter being thus stated, the assembly of

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New-York either had, or had not a right to refuse submission to that act. If they had, and I imagine no American will say, they had not, then the parliament had no *right* to compel them to execute it. If they had not *that right*, they had no *right* to punish them for not executing it; and therefore had no *right* to suspend their legislation, which is a punishment. In fact if the people of New-York cannot be legally taxed but by their own representatives, they cannot be legally deprived of the privilege of making laws only for insisting on that exclusive privilege of taxation. If they may be legally deprived in such a case of the privilege of making laws, why may they not with equal reason be deprived of every other privilege? Or why may not every colony be treated in the same manner, when any of them shall dare to deny their assent to any impositions that shall be directed? Or what signifies the repeal of the *Stamp-Act*, if these colonies are to lose their *other* privileges, by not tamely surrendering that of *taxation*?

There is one consideration arising from this suspension which is not generally attended to, but shews its importance very clearly, It was not *necessary*, that this suspension should be caused by an act of parliament. The crown might have restrained the governor of New-York, even from calling the assembly together, by its prerogative in the royal governments. This step I suppose would have been taken, if the conduct of the assembly of New-York had been regarded as an act of disobedience *to the crown alone*: But it is regarded as an act of "disobedience to the authority of the *British legislature*." This gives the suspension a consequence vastly more affecting. It is a parliamentary assertion of *supreme authority* of the British legislature over these colonies in the *point of taxation*;

on; and is intended to *compel* New-York unto a submission to that authority. It seems therefore to me as much a violation of the liberty of the people of that province, and consequently to all these colonies, as if the parliament had sent a number of regiments to be quartered upon them, till they should comply. For it is evident that the suspension is meant as a compulsion; and the *method* of compelling it is totally indifferent. It is indeed probable, that the sight of red coats, and the beating of drums would have been most alarming, because people are generally more influenced by their eyes and ears than by their reason: But whoever seriously considers the matter, must perceive that a dreadful stroke is aimed at the liberty of these colonies. I say of these colonies: For the cause of *one* is the cause of *all*. If the parliament may lawfully deprive New-York of any of its rights, it may deprive any, or all the other colonies of their rights; and nothing can possibly so much encourage such attempts, as a mutual inattention to the interest of each other. *To divide and thus to destroy*, is the first political maxim in attacking those who are powerful by their union. He certainly is not a wise man, who folds his arms and reposeth himself at home, seeing with unconcern the flames that have invaded his neighbour's house, without any endeavours to extinguish them. When Mr. Hampden's ship-money cause, for three shillings and four-pence, was tried, all the people of England with anxious expectation, interested themselves in the important decision; and when the slightest point touching the freedom of a single colony is agitated, I earnestly wish, that all the rest may with equal ardour support their sister.

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Very much may be said on this subject, but I hope more at present is unnecessary.

With concern I have observed that two assemblies of this province have sat and adjourned, without taking any notice of this act. It may perhaps be asked, what would have been proper for them to do? I am by no means fond of inflammatory measures. I detest them. I should be sorry that any thing should be done which might justly displease our sovereign or our mother-country. But a firm, modest exertion of a free spirit should never be wanting on public occasions. It appears to me that it would have been sufficient for the assembly, to have ordered our agents to represent to the King's ministers, their sense of the suspending act, and to pray for its repeal. Thus we should have borne our testimony against it; and might therefore reasonably expect that on a like occasion, we might receive the same assistance from the other colonies.

(b) "*Concordia res parvæ crescunt.*"

Nov. 4.

A FARMER,

LETTER II.

THERE is another act of parliament, which appears to me to be unconstitutional, and as destructive to the liberty of these colonies, as that mentioned in my last letter; that is, the act granting duties on paper and glass, &c. The parliament unquestionably possesses a legal authority to regulate the trade of Great-Britain and

(b) Small things grow great by concord—

and all her colonies. Such an authority is essential to the relation between a mother-country and her colonies, and necessary for the common good of all. He who considers these provinces, as states distinct from the British empire, has very slender notions of *justice* or of *their interests*. We are but parts of a *whole*, and therefore there must exist a power somewhere, to preside, and preserve the connection in due order. This power is lodged in the parliament; and we are as much dependant on Great-Britain, as a perfectly free people can be on another.

I have looked over every statute relating to these colonies, from their first settlement to this time; and I find every one of them founded on this principle till the *Stamp-act* administration. (a) All before,

(a) For the satisfaction of the reader, recitals from former acts of parliament relating to these colonies are added. By comparing these with the modern acts, he will perceive their great difference, in *expression* and *intention*.

The 12th *Charles II.* chap. 18, which forms the foundation of the laws relating to *our* trade, by enacting that certain productions of the colonies shall be carried to England only, and that no goods shall be imported from the plantations but in ships belonging to England, Ireland, Wales, Berwick, or the Plantations, &c. begins thus. "For the *increase of shipping* and *encouragement of the navigation of this nation*, wherein under the good providence and protection of GOD, the wealth, *safety* and strength of this kingdom is so much concerned, &c.

The 15th *Charles II.* chap. 7th, enforcing the same regulation, assigns these reasons for it: "In regard his Majesty's plantations beyond the seas are inhabited

fore, are calculated to regulate trade and preserve or promote

habited and peopled by his subjects of this his kingdom of England; for the *maintaining a greater correspondence and kindness between them*, and keeping them in a firmer dependance upon it, and rendering them yet more beneficial and advantageous unto it in the *further employment and increase of the English shipping and seamen, vent of English woollen and other manufactures and commodities, rendering the navigation to and from the same more safe and cheap*, and making this kingdom a *staple* not only of the commodities of those plantations, but also of the commodities of other countries and places, *for the supplying of them*; and it being the *usage* of other nations to keep their plantations trade to themselves," &c.

The 25th Charles II. chap. 7th, made expressly "*for the better securing the plantation trade*," which imposes duties on certain commodities exported from one colony to another, mentions this cause for imposing them, "Whereas by one act passed in the 12th year of your Majesty's reign, entitled, *An act for the encouragement of shipping and navigation*, and by several other laws passed since that time, it is permitted to ship, &c. sugars, tobacco, &c. of the growth &c. of any of your Majesty's plantations in America, &c. from the places of their growth, &c. to any of his Majesty's plantations, in those parts, &c. and that *without paying customs for the same*, either at the lading or unlading of the said commodities, by means whereof the trade and navigation in those commodities, from one plantation to another, is greatly increased: and the inhabitants of divers of those colonies, *not contenting themselves with being supplied with those commodities for their own use free from all customs* (while the subjects of this your kingdom of England have paid great customs and impositions for what of them hath been spent here) *but contrary to the express letter of the aforesaid laws*, have brought

promote a mutually beneficial intercourse between
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into divers parts of Europe, great quantities thereof, and do also vend great quantities thereof to the shipping of other nations, who bring them into divers parts of Europe, to the great hurt and diminution of your Majesty's customs, and of the trade and navigation of this your kingdom; for the prevention thereof," &c.

The 7th and 8th *William III.* chap 22, entitled "An act for preventing frauds, and regulating abuses in the plantation trade," recites, that "Notwithstanding, divers, acts, &c. great abuses are daily committed, to the *prejudice of the English navigation*, and the *loss of great part of the plantation trade*, to this kingdom, by the *artifice and cunning of ill-disposed persons; for remedy whereof, &c.* And whereas in some of his Majesties American plantations, a doubt or misconstruction has arisen upon the before mentioned acts made in the 25th year of the reign of king *Charles II.* whereby certain duties are laid upon the commodities therein enumerated (which by law may be transported from one plantation to another, for the supplying of each others wants) *as if the same were by the payment of those duties in one plantation, discharged from giving the securities* intended by the aforesaid acts made in the 12th, 22d, and 23d years of the reign of king *Charles II.* and consequently be at liberty to go to any foreign market in Europe," &c.

The 6th *Anne*, chap. 37, reciting the "advancement of trade, &c. and encouragement of ships of war," &c. grants to the *captors* the property of all prizes, carried into America, subject to such customs and duties, &c. as if the same had been first imported into any part of Great Britain, and from thence exported, &c.

This was a gift to persons *acting under commissions from the crown*, and therefore it was reasonable that
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the several constituent parts of the empire ; and tho' many of them imposed duties on trade, yet those duties were always imposed with *design* to restrain the commerce of one part, that was injurious to another

the *terms prescribed in that gift* shall be complied with, --more especially as the payment of such duties was intended to give a preference to the productions of the British colonies, over those of other colonies. However, being found *inconvenient to the colonies*, about four years afterwards, this act was *for that reason*, so far repealed, that by another act "all *prize goods* imported into any part of Great-Britain, from any of the plantations," were made liable "to such duties only in Great-Britain, as in case they had been of the growth and produce of the plantations."

The 6th, *George II*, chap 13, which imposes duties on foreign rum, sugar and molasses, imported into the colonies, shews the reason thus—"Whereas the welfare and prosperity of your Majesty's sugar colonies in America are of the greatest consequence and importance to the *trade navigation and strength* of this kingdom; and whereas the planters of the said sugar colonies, have of late years *fallen into such great discouragements* that they are unable to improve or carry on the sugar trade *upon an equal footing* with the foreign sugar colonies, *without some advantage and relief be given to them from Great-Britain: For remedy whereof, and for the good and welfare of your Majesty's subjects, &c.*

The 29th *George II*. chap. 26, and the 1st *George III*. chap. 9th, which contains the 6th *George II*. chap. 13th, declare, "that the said act hath by experience been found *useful and beneficial, &c.*—(These are all the most considerable statutes relating to the commerce of the colonies ; and it is thought to be utterly unnecessary to add any observations to these extracts, to prove that they were intended solely as *regulations of trade.*)—"

another, and thus to promote the general welfare. The raising a revenue thereby was never intended. Thus the king by his judges in his courts of justice, imposes fines, which altogether amount to a very considerable sum, and contribute to the support of government: But this is merely a consequence arising from restrictions that only meant to keep peace, and prevent confusion; and surely a man would argue very loosely, who should conclude from hence, that the king has a right to levy money in general upon his subjects. Never did the British parliament, till the period above-mentioned, think of imposing duties in America *for the purpose of raising a revenue*. Mr. Grenville's sagacity first introduced this language, in the preamble to the fourth of George III. chap. 15th, which has these words,—“ And whereas it is just and necessary, that *a revenue be raised in your Majesty's said dominions in America, for defraying the expences of defending, protecting and securing the same*: We your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects *the commons of Great-Britain*, in parliament assembled, being desirous to make some provision in this present session of parliament, *towards raising the said revenue in America*, have resolved to give and grant unto your Majesty the several rates and duties herein after mentioned,” &c.

A few months after came the *Stamp-act*, which reciting this, proceeds in the same strange mode of expression, thus—“ And whereas it is just and necessary, that provision be made *for raising a further revenue within your Majesty's dominions in America towards defraying the said expences*, we your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, *the commons of Great-Britain*, &c. Give and grant,” &c. as before.

The last act granting duties upon paper, &c.

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carefully pursues these modern precedents. The preamble is, "Whereas it is expedient *that a revenue should be raised in your Majesty's dominions in America, for making a more certain and adequate provision for defraying the charge of the administration of justice, and the support of civil government in such provinces, where it shall be found necessary; and towards the further defraying the expences of defending, protecting and securing the said dominions, we your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects the commons of Great-Britain, &c. give and grant, &c.*" as before. Here we may observe an authority *expressly* claimed and exerted, to impose duties on these colonies; not for the regulation of trade, not for the preservation or promotion of a mutually beneficial intercourse between the several constituent parts of the empire, heretofore the *sole objects* of parliamentary institutions; *but for the single purpose of levying money upon us.*

This I call an innovation (b), and a most dangerous innovation. It may perhaps be objected, that Great-Britain has a right to lay what duties she pleases upon her exports (c), and it makes no difference

(b) "It is worthy observation how quietly subsidies granted in forms *usual and accustomable* (though heavy) are borne; such a power hath use and custom; on the other side, what discontentments, and disturbances subsidies framed in a new mould do raise (*such an inbred hatred novelty doth hatch*) is evident by examples of former times," Lord Coke's 2 *Institute*, p. 33.

(c) Some people, whose minds seem incapable of uniting two ideas, think that Great-Britain has the same right to impose duties on the exports to these colonies as on the Exports to Spain and Portugal, &c. Such Persons attend so much to the idea of exportation

difference to us whether they are paid here or there. To this I answer—These colonies require many things for their use, which the laws of Great-Britain, prohibit them from getting any where *but from her*. Such are paper and glass.

That we may legally be bound to pay any *general* duties on these commodities, relative to the regulation of trade, is granted; but we being *obliged by her* laws to take them from Great-Britain, any *special* duties imposed on their exportation to us only, *with intention to raise a revenue from us only*, are as much *taxes* upon us as those imposed by the *Stamp-act*.

What is the difference in *substance* and *right*, whether the same sum is raised upon us by the rates mentioned in the *Stamp-act* on the *use* of paper, or by these duties on the *importation* of it? It is nothing but the edition of a former book, with a new title page.

Suppose the duties were made payable in Great-Britain?

It signifies nothing to us whether they are to be paid here or there. Had the *Stamp-act* directed, that all the paper should be landed at *Florida*, and the duties paid there before it was brought to the *British* colonies, would the act have raised less money upon us, or have been less destructive of our rights?

tion, that they entirely drop that of the connection between the mother country and her colonies.

If Great-Britain had always claimed and exercised an authority to compel Spain and Portugal to import manufactures from her only, the cases would be parallel: But as she has never pretended to such a right, they are at liberty to get them where they please; and if they choose to take them from her, rather than from other nations, they voluntarily consent to pay the duties imposed on them.

rights? By no means: For as we were under a *necessity* of using the paper we should have been under a *necessity* of paying the duties. Thus in the present case, a like *necessity* will subject us, if this act continues in force, to the payment of the duties now imposed.

Why was the *Stamp-act* then so pernicious to freedom? It did not enact that every man in the colonies *should* buy a certain quantity of paper——No! It only directed, that no instrument of writing should be valid in law, if not made on stamp paper, &c.

The makers of that act knew full well, that the confusions that would arise upon the disuse of writings would *compel* the colonies to use the stamp-paper, and therefore to pay the taxes imposed. For this reason the *Stamp-act* was said to be a law that *would execute itself*. For the very same reason, the last act of parliament, if it is granted to have any force here, *will execute itself*," and will be attended with the very same consequences to *American* liberty.

Some persons perhaps may say, that this act lays us under no necessity to pay the Duties imposed, because we may ourselves manufacture the articles on which they are laid——whereas by the *Stamp-act* no instrument of writing could be good, unless made on British paper, and that too stamp.

Such an objection amounts to no more than this; that the injury resulting to these colonies, from the total disuse of British paper and glass, will not be so afflicting as that which would have resulted from the total disuse of writing among them; for by that means even the *Stamp-act* might have been eluded. Why then was it universally detested by them as slavery itself? Because it presented to these devoted provinces nothing but a choice of calamities, embitter'd by indignities, each of which it was

unworthy of freemen to bear. But is no injury a violation of right but the greatest injury? If the eluding the payment of the taxes imposed by the *Stamp-act* would have subjected us to a more dreadful inconvenience, than the eluding the payment of those imposed by the late act, does it therefore follow that the last is no violation of our rights, though it is calculated for the same purpose the other was, that is *to raise money upon us without our consent?*

This would be making right to consist not in an exemption from injury, but from a certain degree of injury.

But the objectors may further say, that we shall suffer no injury at all by the disuse of *British* paper and glass. We might not if we could make as much as we want. But can any man acquainted with *America*, believe this possible? I am told there are but two or three *Glass-Houses* on this continent, and but very few *Paper-Mills*; and suppose more should be erected, a long course of years must elapse, before they can be brought to perfection. This continent is a country of planters, farmers, and fishermen; not of manufactures. The difficulty of establishing particular manufactures in such a country is almost insuperable. For one manufacture is connected with others in such a manner, that it may be said to be impossible to establish one or two without establishing several others. The experience of many nations may convince us of this truth.

Inexpressible therefore must be our distresses in evading the late acts, by the disuse of *British* paper and glass. Nor will this be the extent of our misfortune, if we admit the legality of that act.

Great-Britain has prohibited the manufacturing iron and steel in these colonies, without any objection being made to her right of doing it. The like right she must have to prohibit any other manufacture.

nufacture among us. Thus she is possessed of an undisputed *precedent* on that point. This authority she will say, is founded on the *original intention* of settling these colonies; that is that she should manufacture for them and that they should supply her with materials. The *equity* of this policy, she will also say, has been universally acknowledged by the colonies, who never have made the least objection to statutes for that purpose; and will further appear by the *mutual benefits* flowing from this usage, ever since the settlement of these colonies.

Our great advocate, Mr. *Pitt* in his speeches on the debate concerning the repeal of the *Stamp-act*, acknowledged that *Great-Britain* could restrain our manufactures. His words are these—"This kingdom, as the supreme governing and legislative power, has *always* bound the colonies by her regulations and *restrictions* in trade, in navigation, in manufactures—in every thing *except that of taking their money out of their pockets, without their consent.*" Again he says, "We may bind their trade, *confine their manufactures*, and exercise every power whatever *except that of taking their money out of their pockets without their consent.*"

Here then, my dear countrymen, rouse yourselves and behold the ruin hanging over your heads. If you ONCE admit that *Great-Britain* may lay duties upon her exportations to us *for the purpose of levying money on us only*, she then will have nothing to do but to lay those duties on the articles which she prohibits us to manufacture—and the tragedy of *American liberty* is finished. We have been prohibited from procuring manufactures, in all cases, any where but from *Great-Britain* (excepting linens which we are permitted to import directly from *Ireland*.) We have been prohibited, in some cases from manufacturing for ourselves; and may be prohibited in others. We are therefore

therefore exactly in the situation of a city besieged, which is surrounded by the works of the besiegers in every part *but one*. If *that* is closed up, no step can be taken, *but to surrender at discretion*. If *Great-Britain* can order us to come to her for the necessaries we want, and can order us to pay what taxes she pleases before we take them away, or when we land them here, we are as abject slaves as *France* and *Poland* can shew in wooden shoes, and with uncombed hair. (d)

Perhaps the nature of the necessities of dependant states, caused by the policy of a governing one, for her own benefit, may be elucidated by a fact mentioned in history. When the *Carthaginians* were possessed of the island of *Sardinia*, they made a decree that the *Sardinians* should not raise corn nor get it any other way than from the *Carthaginians*. Then by imposing any duties they would upon it, they drained from the miserable *Sardinians* any sums they pleased; and whenever that miserable and oppressed people made the least movement to assert their liberty, their tyrants starved them to death or submission. This may be called the most perfect kind of political necessity.

From what has been said I think this uncontrovertible conclusion may be deduced, that when a ruling state obliges a dependant state to take certain commodities from her alone, it is implied in the nature of that obligation; is essentially requisite to give it the least degree of justice; and is inseparably united with it in order to preserve any share of freedom to the dependant state; *that those commodities should never be loaded with duties, for the sole purpose of levying money on the dependant state.* Upon

(d) The peasants of *France* wear wooden shoes; and the vassals of *Poland* are remarkable for matted hair, which never can be combed.

Upon the whole the single question is whether the parliament can legally impose duties to be paid *by the people of these colonies only, for the sole purpose of raising a revenue, on commodities which she obliges us to take from her alone*; or in other words, whether the parliament can legally take money out of our pockets without our consent. If they can, our boasted liberty is but

Vox et prætera nihil.

A sound, and nothing else.

A F A R M E R.

LETTER III.

I REJOICE to find that my two former letters to you, have been generally received with so much favour by such of you, whose sentiments I have had an opportunity of knowing. Could you look into my heart, you would instantly perceive an ardent affection for your persons, a zealous attachment to your interests, a lively resentment of every insult and injury offered to your honour or happiness, and an inflexible resolution to assert your rights, to the utmost of my weak power, to be the only motives that have engaged me to address you.

I am no further concerned in any thing affecting *America* than any one of you; and when liberty leaves it, I can quit it much more conveniently than most of you: But while Divine Providence, that gave me existence in a land of freedom, permits my head to think, my lips to speak, and my hand to move, I shall so highly and gratefully value the blessing received, as to take care, that my silence and inactivity shall not give my implied assent to any act, degrading my brethren and myself from
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the birthright wherewith heaven itself *hath made us free.*" (a)

Sorry I am to learn that there are some few persons who shake their heads with solemn motion, and pretend to wonder what can be the meaning of these letters. "*Great-Britain,*" they say, "is too powerful to contend with; she is determined to oppress us; it is in vain to speak of right on one side, when there is power on the other; when we are strong enough to resist, we shall attempt it; but now we are not strong enough, and therefore we had better be quiet; it signifies nothing to convince us that our rights are invaded, when we cannot defend them; and if we should get into riots and tumults, about the late act, it will only draw down their heavier displeasure upon us."

What can such men design? What do their grave observations amount to, but this—"that these colonies, totally regardless of their liberties, should commit them with humble resignation, to *chance, time,* and the tender mercies of *ministers?*"

Are these men ignorant, that usurpations, which might have been successfully opposed, at first, acquire strength by continuance, and thus become irresistible? Do they condemn the conduct of these colonies concerning the *Stamp-Act*? Or have they forgot its successful issue? Ought the Colonies at that time, instead of acting as they did, to have trusted for relief to the fortuitous events of futurity? If it is needless "to speak of rights" now, it was as needless then. If the behaviour of the colonies was prudent and glorious then, and successful too; it will be equally prudent and glorious to act in the same manner now, if our rights are equally invaded, and may be as successful. There-
fore

fore it becomes necessary to enquire, whether "our rights *are* invaded." To talk of "defending" them, as if they could be no otherwise "defended" than by arms, is as much out of the way, as if a man having a choice of several roads to reach his journey's end, should prefer the worst, for no other reason, but because it is the worst.

As to "riots and tumults," the gentlemen who are so apprehensive of them, are much mistaken, if they think that grievances cannot be redressed without such assistance.

I will now tell the gentlemen, what is "the meaning of these letters." The meaning of them is to convince the people of these colonies, that they are at this moment exposed to the most imminent dangers; and to persuade them immediately, vigorously, and unanimously, to exert themselves in the most firm, but most peaceable manner, for obtaining relief.

The cause of liberty is a cause of too much dignity, to be sullied by turbulence and tumult. It ought to be maintained in a manner suitable to her nature. Those who engage in it should breathe a sedate yet fervent spirit, animating them to actions of prudence, justice, modesty, bravery, humanity and magnanimity.

To such a wonderful degree were the ancient *Spartans*, as brave and free a people as ever existed, inspired by this happy temperature of soul, that rejecting even in their battles the use of trumpets, and other instruments for exciting heat and rage, they marched up to scenes of havock and horror, (b) with the sound of flutes, to the tunes of which their steps kept pace—"exhibiting," as *Plutarch* says, at once a terrible and delightful sight, and proceeding with a deliberate valour full

(b) *Plutarch in the life of Lycurgus. Archbishop Potter's Archaeologia Græca.*

full of hope and good assurance, as if some divinity had sensibly assisted them.

I hope, my dear countrymen, that you will, in every colony, be upon your guard against those who may at any time endeavour to stir you up, under pretence of patriotism, or any measures, disrespectful to our Sovereign, or to our mother country. Hot, rash, disorderly proceedings, injure the reputation of a people, as to wisdom, valour and virtue, without procuring them the least benefit. I pray GOD that he may be pleased to inspire you and your posterity, to the latest ages, with that spirit of which I have an idea, but find a difficulty to express. To express it in the best manner I can, I mean a spirit that shall so guide you, that it will be impossible to determine whether an *American's* character is most distinguishable, for his loyalty to his Sovereign, his duty to his mother country; his love of freedom, or his affection for his native soil.

Every government at some time or other falls into wrong measures. These may proceed from mistake or passion. But every such measure does not dissolve the obligation between the governors and the governed. The mistake may be corrected; the passion may pass over. It is the duty of the governed to endeavour to rectify the mistake, and to appease the passion. They have not at first any other right, than to represent their grievances, and to pray for redress, unless an emergence is so pressing, as not to allow time for receiving an answer to their applications, which rarely happens. If their applications are disregarded then that kind of *opposition* becomes justifiable, which can be made without breaking the laws, or disturbing the publick peace. This consists in the *prevention of the oppressors' reaping advantage from their oppressions*, and not in their punishment. For experience may
teach

teach them, what reason did not; and harsh methods cannot be proper till milder ones have failed.

If at length it becomes *undoubted*, that an inveterate resolution is formed to annihilate the liberties of the governed, the *English* history affords frequent examples of resistance by force. What particular circumstances will in any future case justify such resistance, can never be ascertained, till they happen. Perhaps it may be allowable to say generally, that it never can be justifiable, until the people are *fully convinced*, that any further submission will be destructive to their happiness.

When the appeal is made to the sword, highly probable is it, that the punishment will exceed the offence; and the calamities attending on war outweigh those preceding it. These considerations of justice and prudence, will always have great influence with good and wise men.

To these reflections on this subject, it remains to be added, and ought for ever to be remembered, that resistance in the case of colonies against their mother country is extremely different from the resistance of a people against their prince. A nation may change their king, or race of kings, and, retaining their ancient form of government, be gainers by changing. Thus *Great-Britain*, under the illustrious house of *Brunswick*, a house that seems to flourish for the happiness of mankind, has found a felicity unknown in the reigns of the *Stewarts*. But if once *we* are separated from our mother country, what new form of government shall we adopt, or where shall we find another *Britain*, to supply our loss? Torn from the body, to which we are united by religion, liberty, laws, affections, relation, language and commerce, we must bleed at every vein.

I truth—the prosperity of these provinces is founded

founded in their dependence on *Great-Britain*; and when she returns to her "old good humour, and her old good nature," as lord *Clarendon* expresses it, I hope they will always think it their duty and interest, as it most certainly will be, to promote her welfare by all the means in their power.

We cannot act with too much caution in our disputes. Anger produces anger; and differences that might be accommodated by kind and respectful behaviour, may, by imprudence be enlarged to incurable rage. In quarrels between countries, as well as in those between individuals, when they have risen to a certain height, the first cause of dissension is no longer remembered, the minds of the parties being wholly engaged in recollecting and resenting the mutual expressions of their dislike. When feuds have reach'd that fatal point, all considerations of reason and equity vanish; and a blind fury governs, or rather confounds all things. A people no longer regards their interest, but the gratification of their wrath. The sway of the (a) *Cleons* and *Clodius's*, the designing and detestable flatterers of the prevailing passion, becomes confirmed. Wise and good men in vain oppose the storm, and may think themselves fortunate, if, in attempting to preserve their ungrateful fellow citizens, they do not ruin themselves. Their prudence will be called *baseness*; their moderation *guilt*; and if their virtue does not lead them to destruction, as that of many other great and excellent persons has done, they may survive to receive from their expiring country the mournful glory of her acknowledgment, that their counsels, if regarded would have saved her.

D

The

(a) *Cleon* was a popular firebrand of *Athens*, and *Clodius* of *Rome*; each of which plunged his country into the deepest calamities.

The constitutional modes of obtaining relief, are those which I would wish to see pursued on the present occasion; that is by petitions of our assemblies, or where they are not permitted to meet, of the people, to the powers that can afford us relief.

We have an excellent prince, in whose good disposition towards us we may confide. We have a generous, sensible and humane nation, to whom we may apply. They may be deceived, They may, by artful men, be provoked to anger against us. I cannot believe they will be cruel or unjust; or that their anger will be implacable. Let us behave like dutiful children, who have received unmerited blows from a beloved parent. Let us complain to our parent; but let our complaints speak at the same time the language of affliction, and veneration.

If, however, it shall happen, by an unfortunate course of affairs, that our applications to his Majesty, and the parliament for redress, prove ineffectual, let us *then* take *another step*, by withholding from *Great-Britain* all the advantage she has been used to receive from us. *Then* let us try if our ingenuity, industry, and frugality, will not give weight to our remonstrances. Let us all be united with one spirit, in one cause. Let us invent—let us work—let us save—let us at the same time keep up our claim, and incessantly repeat our complaints—But above all, let us implore the protection of that infinitely good and gracious being, (d) ‘ by whom kings reign and princes decree justice.

Nil desperandum.

Nothing is to be despaired of.

A F A R M E R.
LET-

L E T T E R IV.

AN objection, I hear has been made against what I offered in my second letter, which I would willingly clear up before I proceed. "There is," say these objectors, "a material difference between the *Stamp-act* and the *late act* for laying a duty on paper, &c. that justifies the conduct of those who opposed the former, and yet are willing to submit to the latter. The duties imposed by the *Stamp-act* were *internal* taxes; but the present are *external*, and therefore the parliament may have a right to impose them.

To this I answer with a total denial of the power of parliament to lay upon these colonies any "*tax*" whatever.

This point being so important to this, and to succeeding generations, I wish to be clearly understood.

To the word "*tax*," I annex that meaning which the constitution and history of *England* require to be annexed to it; that is—that it is an imposition on the subject, for the sole purpose of levying money.

In the early ages of our monarchy, certain services were rendered to the crown for the general good. These were personal: (a) But in process
of

(a) It is very worthy of remark, how watchful our wise ancestors were, lest their *services* should be increased beyond what the law allowed. No man was bound to go out of the realm to serve the King. Therefore, even in the conquering reign of *Henry the Fifth*, when the martial spirit of the nation was highly enflamed by the heroic courage of their Prince, and by his great success, they still carefully guarded against

of time, such institutions being found inconvenient, *gifts* and *grants* of their own property were made by the people, under the several names of *aids*, *tallages*, *tasks*, *taxes* and *subsidies*, &c. These were made, as may be collected even from the names, for public service upon "need and necessity." (b) All these sums were laid upon the people by virtue of their voluntary gift. (c) Their design was

gainst the establishment of illegal services. "When this point (says Lord Chief Justice *Coke*) concerning maintenance of wars out of *England*, came in question, the *commons* did make their continual claim of their *antient freedom* and *birthright*, as in the first of *Henry the Fifth*, and in the seventh of *Henry the Fifth*, &c. the *commons* made a *PROTEST*, that they were not bound to the maintenance of war in *Scotland*, *Ireland*, *Calice*, *France*, *Normandy*, or other foreign parts, and caused their *PROTESTS* to be entered into the parliament rolls, where they yet remain; which, in effect, agreeth with that which, upon like occasion, was made in the parliament of 25th *Edward I.*" 2d Inst. p. 528.

(b) 4th Inst. p. 28

(c) *Reges Angliæ, nihil tale nisi convocatis primis ordinibus, et assentiente populo suscipiunt.* Phil. Comines.

These gifts entirely depending on the pleasure of the donors, were proportioned to the several ranks of people who gave, and were regulated by their opinion of the publick necessities. Thus *Edward I.* had in his 11th year a *thirtieth* from the *laiety*, a *twentieth* from the *clergy*; in his 22d year a *tenth* from the *laiety* a sixth from *London*, and other corporate towns, *half* of their *benefices* from the *clergy*; in his 23d year, an eleventh from the barons and others, a tenth from the *clergy*, and a *seventh* from the *burgesses*, &c. *Humes, Hist. of England.*

The same difference in the grants of the several ranks is observable in other reigns. In

was to support the national honour and interest. Some of those grants comprehended duties arising from trade; being imposts on merchandizes. These Lord Chief Justice *Coke* classes under "subsidies," and "parliamentary aids." They are also called "customs." But whatever the name was, they were always considered as gifts of the people to the crown, to be employed for public uses.

Commerce was at a low ebb, and surprising instances might be produced how little it was attended to for a succession of ages. The terms that have been mentioned, and, among the rest, that of "tax," had obtained a national, parliamentary meaning drawn from the principles of the constitution, long before any *Englishman* thought of regulations of trade, by the imposition of duties.

Whenever we speak of "taxes" among *Englishmen*, let us therefore speak of them with reference

E to

In the famous statute *de tallagio non concedendo*, the king enumerates the several classes, without whose consent, he and his heirs never should set or levy any tax—"nullum tallagium, vel auxilium per nos, vel heredes nostros in regno nostro ponatur seu levetur, sine voluntate et assensu archiepiscoporum, episcoporum, comitum, baronum, militum, burgensium, et aliorum liberorum com. de regno nostro." 34th Edward first.

Lord Chief Justice *Coke*, in his comment on these words lays—"for the quieting of the commons, and for a perpetual and constant law for ever after, both in this and other like cases, this act was made." "These words are plain, without any scruple, absolute, without any saving." 2d *Coke's* Inst. p. 532, 533. Little did the venerable judge imagine, that "other like cases" would happen, in which the spirit of this law would be despised by *Englishmen*, the posterity of those who made it.

(d) The

to the *intentions* with which, and the *principles* on which they have been established. This will give certainty to our expression, and safety to our conduct: But if, when we have in view the liberty of these colonies, and the influence of taxes laid without our consent, we proceed in any other course, we pursue a *Juno* (*d*) indeed, but shall only catch a cloud.

In the national, parliamentary sense insisted on, the word "*tax*" (*e*) was certainly understood by the congress at *New-York*, whose resolves may be said to form the *American* "*bill of rights*."

The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth resolves, are thus expressed.

III. "That it is *inseparably essential* to the *freedom* of a people, and the *undoubted right* of *Englishmen*, that *no tax* be imposed on them, *but with their own consent*, given personally, or by their representatives."

IV. "That the people of the colonies are not, and, from their local circumstances, cannot be represented in the house of commons in *Great-Britain*."

V. "That the only representatives of the people of the colonies, are the persons chosen therein by themselves; and that *no taxes* ever have been, or can be constitutionally imposed on them, but by their respective legislatures."

VI. "That all *supplies to the crown*, being free gifts of the people, it is unreasonable and inconsistent with the principles and spirit of the British constitution, for the people of *Great-Britain* to grant to his Majesty the *property of the colonies*."

Here

(*d*) The Goddess of *Empire*, in the Heathen Mythology; according to an ancient fable, *Ixion* pursued her, but she escaped in a cloud.

(*e*) In this sense *Montesquieu* uses the word "*tax*," in his 13th book of *Spirit of Laws*.

Here is no distinction made between *internal* and *external* taxes. It is evident from the short reasoning thrown into these resolves, that every imposition "to grant to his Majesty *the property of the Colonies*," was thought a tax; and that every such imposition, if laid any other way "but with their consent, given personally, or by their representatives," was not only "unreasonable, and inconsistent, with the principles and spirit of the *British* constitution," but destructive "to the freedom of a people."

This language is clear and important. A "tax" means an imposition to raise money. Such persons therefore as speak of *internal* and *external* "taxes," I pray may pardon me, if I object to that expression, as applied to the privileges and interests of these colonies. There may be *internal* and *external impositions*, founded on *different principles*, and having *different tendencies*, every "tax" being an imposition, tho' every imposition is not a "tax." But *all taxes* are founded on the *same principle*; and have the *same tendency*.

External impositions, for the regulation of our trade, do not "grant to his Majesty *the property of the colonies*." They only *prevent the colonies acquiring property*, in things not necessary, in a manner judged to be injurious to the welfare of the whole empire. But the last statute respecting us, "grants to his Majesty *the property of the colonies*," by laying duties on the manufactures of *Great-Britain* which they *must* take, and which she settled them, on purpose that they *should* take.

What (a) tax can be more *internal* than this? Here is money drawn, *without their consent*, from

(a) It seems to be evident, that Mr. Pitt, in his defence of *America*, during the debate concerning the repeal of the Stamp-Act, by "*internal taxes*," meant any duties "for the purpose of raising a revenue;" and by "*external taxes*," meant "duties imposed

a society, who have constantly enjoyed a constitutional mode of raising all money among themselves. The payment of this *tax* they have no possible method of avoiding; as they cannot do without the commodities on which it is laid, and they cannot manufacture these commodities themselves. Besides, if this unhappy country should be so lucky

imposed for the regulation of trade." His expressions are these—"If the gentleman does not understand the difference between *internal* and *external* taxes, I cannot help it; but there is a plain distinction between taxes levied *for the purposes of raising a revenue*, and duties imposed *for the regulation of trade*, for the accommodation of the subject; altho, in the consequences some revenue might incidentally arise from the latter."

These words were in Mr. Pitt's reply to Mr. Grenville, who said he could not understand the difference between external and internal taxes. But Mr. Pitt, in his first speech, had made no such distinction; and his meaning, when he mentions the distinction, appears to be—that by "*external taxes*" be intended impositions, for the purpose of regulating the intercourse of the colonies with others; and by "*internal taxes*," be intended impositions, for the purpose of taking money from them.

In every other part of his speeches on that occasion, his words confirm this construction of his expressions. The following extracts will shew how positive and general were his assertions of our right.

"It is my opinion that this Kingdom has *no right* to lay a *tax* upon the colonies."—"The *Americans* are the *sons*, not the *Bastards* of England. *Taxation* is *no part* of the governing or legislative power."—"The *taxes* are a voluntary gift and grant of the commons alone. In legislation the three estates of the realm are *a like* concerned, but the concurrence of the *peers* and the *crown* to a *tax*, is only necessary

lucky as to elude this act, by getting parchment enough, in the place of paper, or by reviving the antient method of writing on wax and bark, and by inventing something to serve instead of glass, her ingenuity would stand her in little

to close with the form of a law. The gift and grant is of the commons alone."—"The distinction between legislation and taxation is essentially necessary to liberty."—"The commons of America, represented in their several assemblies, have ever been in possession of the exercise of this, their constitutional right, of giving and granting their own money. They would have been Slaves, if they had not enjoyed it."—"The idea of a virtual representation of America in this house, is the most contemptible idea that ever entered into the head of man.—It does not deserve a serious refutation."

He afterwards shews the unreasonableness of Great-Britain taxing America, thus—"When I had the honour of serving his Majesty, I availed myself of the means of information, which I derived from my office: I speak therefore from knowledge. My materials were good. I was at pains to collect, to digest, to consider them; and I will be bold to affirm, that the profit to Great-Britain from the trade of the colonies, through all its branches, is two millions a year. This is the fund that carried you triumphantly through the last war. The estates that were rented at two thousand pounds a year, threescore years ago, are at three thousand pounds at present. Those estates sold then from fifteen to eighteen years purchase; the same may now be sold for thirty. You owe this to America. This is the price that America pays you for her protection."—"I dare not say how much higher these profits may be augmented,"—"Upon the whole, I will beg leave to tell the house what is really my opinion; it is, that the Stamp-act be repealed absolutely, totally, and immediately. That the reason for the repeal be assigned, because it was founded on an erroneous principle."

little stead; for then the parliament would have nothing to do but to prohibit such manufactures or to lay a tax on *hats* and *woollen cloths*, which they have already prohibited the colonies from supplying each other with; or on instruments and tools of *steel* and *iron*, which they have prohibited the provincials *from manufacturing at all*: (b) And then, what little gold and silver they have, must be torn from their hands, or they will not be able in a short time, to get an ax, (c) for cutting their firewood, nor a plough, for raising their food. In what respect, therefore, I beg leave to ask, is the late act preferable to the Stamp-act, or more consistent with the liberties of the colonies? For my own part, I regard them both with equal apprehension? and think they ought to be in the same manner opposed.

*Habemus quidem senatus consultum,—tanquam
gladium in vagina repositum,*

We have a statute, laid up for future use;
like a sword in the scabbard.

A F A R M E R.
L E T.

(b) “ And that *pig* and *bar-iron*, made in his Majesty’s colonies in *America*, may be *further manufactured in this kingdom*, be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that from and after the twenty-fourth day of *June*, 1750, no mill, or other engine, for slitting or rolling of iron, or any plating forge, to work with a tilt hammer, or any furnace for making steel, shall be erected; or, after such erection, continued in *any of his Majesty’s colonies in America*.”
23d *George II.* Chap. 29, Sect. 9.

(c) Tho’ these particulars are mentioned as being absolutely necessary, yet perhaps they are not more so than glass in our severe winters, to keep out the cold from our houses; or than paper, without which such inexpressible confusions must ensue.

LETTER V.

PERHAPS the objection to the late act imposing duties upon paper &c. might have been safely rested on the argument drawn from the universal conduct of the parliaments and ministers, from the first existence of these colonies, to the administration of Mr. *Greenville*.

What but the indisputable, the acknowledged exclusive right of the colonies to tax themselves, could be the reason, that in this long period of more than one hundred and fifty years, no statute was ever passed for the sole purpose of raising a revenue on the colonies? And how clear, how cogent must that reason be, to which every parliament and every minister, for so long a time submitted, without a single attempt to innovate?

England in part of that course of years, and *Great-Britain*, in other parts, was engaged in several fierce and expensive wars; troubled with some tumultuous and bold parliaments; governed by many daring and wicked ministers; yet none of them ever ventured to touch the *Palladium* of *American* liberty. Ambition, avarice, faction, tyranny, all revered it. Whenever it was necessary to raise money on the colonies, the requisitions of the crown were made, and dutifully complied with. The parliament from time to time regulated their trade, and that of the rest of the empire, to preserve their dependence, and the connection of the whole in good order.

The people of *Great-Britain* in support of their privileges, boast much of their antiquity. 'Tis true they are ancient: Yet it may well be questioned, if there is a single privilege of a British subject, supported by longer, more solemn, or
more

more uninterrupted testimony, than the exclusive right of taxation in these colonies. The people of *Great-Britain* consider that kingdom as the sovereign of these colonies, and would now annex to that sovereignty a prerogative never heard of before. How would they bear this, was the case their own? What would they think of a *new* prerogative claimed by the Crown? We may guess what their conduct would be from the transports of passion into which they fell about the late embargo, though laid to relieve the most emergent necessities of state, admitting of no delay; and for which there were numerous precedents. Let our liberties be treated with the same tenderness, and it is all we desire.

Explicit as the conduct of the parliaments, for so many ages is, to prove that no money can be levied on these colonies, by parliament for the purpose of raising a revenue; yet it is not the only evidence in our favour.

Every one of the most material arguments against the legality of the Stamp-Act, operates with equal force against the act now objected to: but as they are well known, it seems unnecessary to repeat them here.

This general one only shall be considered at present. That though these colonies are dependent on *Great-Britain*, and tho' she has a legal power to make laws for preserving that dependence; yet it is not necessary for this purpose, nor essential to the relation between a mother country and her colonies, as was eagerly contended by the advocates for the Stamp-Act, that she should raise money on them without their consent.

Colonies were formerly planted by warlike nations, to keep their enemies in awe; to relieve their country overburthened with inhabitants; or
to

to discharge a number of discontented and troublesome citizens. But in more modern ages, the spirit of violence being in some measure, if the expression may be allowed, sheathed in commerce, colonies have been settled by the nations of *Europe* for the purposes of trade. These purposes were to be attained, by the colonies raising for their mother country those things which she did not produce herself; and by supplying themselves from her with things they wanted. These were the national objects in the commencement of our colonies, and have been uniformly so in their promotion.

To answer these grand purposes, perfect liberty was known to be necessary; all history proving, that trade and freedom are nearly related to each other. By a due regard to this wise and just plan, the infant colonies exposed in the unknown climates and unexplored wildernesses of this new world, lived, grew, and flourished.

The parent country, with undeviating prudence and virtue, attentive to the first principles of colonization, drew to herself the Benefits she might reasonably expect, and preserved to her children the blessings, on which those benefits were founded. She made laws, obliging her colonies to carry to her all those products which she wanted for her own use; and all those raw materials which she chose herself to work up. Besides this restriction, she forbade them to procure manufactures from any other part of the globe, or even the products of European countries, which alone could rival her, without being first brought to her. In short, by a variety of laws she regulated their trade in such a manner as she thought most conducive to their mutual advantage, and her own welfare. A power was reserved to the crown of repealing

any laws that should be enacted. The executive authority of government was all lodged in the crown, and its representatives; and an appeal was secured to the crown from all judgments in the administration of justice.

For all these powers established by the mother country over the colonies; for all these immense emoluments derived by her from them; for all their difficulties and distresses in fixing themselves, what was the recompence made them? A communication of her rights in general, and particularly of that great one, the foundation of all the rest—that their property, acquired with so much pain and hazard, should be disposed of by none but (a) themselves—or, to use the beautiful and emphatical language of the sacred scriptures, (b) “that they should sit every man under his own vine, and under his fig-tree, and none should make them afraid.

Can any man of candor and knowledge deny that these institutions form an affinity between *Great-Britain* and her colonies, that sufficiently secures their dependence upon her? Or that for her to levy taxes upon them, is to reverse the nature of things? Or that she can pursue such a measure, without reducing them to a state of vassalage?

If any person cannot conceive the supremacy of *Great-Britain* to exist, without the power of laying taxes to levy money upon us, the history of the colonies, and of *Great-Britain*, since their settlement, will prove the contrary. He will there find

(a) “The power of *taxing themselves* was the privilege of which the *English* were with reason particularly jealous.”

(b) *Mic. iv. 4.* *Hume's Hist. of England.*

and the amazing advantages arising to her from them—the constant exercise of her supremacy, and their filial submission to it, without a single rebellion, or even the thought of one, from their first emigration to this moment.—And all these things have happened, without one instance of *Great-Britain's* laying taxes to levy money upon them.

How many (c) British Authors have demonstrated,

(c) It has been said in the house of Commons, when complaints have been made of the decay of trade to any part of *Europe*, that such things were not worth regard, as *Great-Britain* was possessed of colonies that could consume more of her manufactures than she was able to supply them with."

"As the case now stands, we shall shew that the plantations are a spring of wealth to this nation, that they work for us, that their treasure *centers all here*, and that the laws have tied them fast enough to us; so that it must be through our own fault and mismanagement, if they become independent of *England*."

Davenant on the Plantation Trade.

"It is better that the islands should be supplied from the Northern Colonies than from *England*, for this reason; the provisions we might send to *Barbados*, *Jamaica*, &c. would be unimproved product of the earth, as grain of all kinds, or such product where there is little got by the improvement, as malt, salt, beef and pork; indeed, the exportation of salt fish thither would be more advantageous, but the goods which we send to the *Northern Colonies*, are such, whose improvement may be justly said one with another to be near *four fifths* of the value of the whole commodity; as apparel, household furniture and many other things."

Idem.

"*New-England* is the most prejudicial plantation to the kingdom of *England*; and yet to do right to that most industrious *English* colony, I must confess, that tho' we lose

strated, that the present wealth, power and glory of their country are founded upon these colonies? As constantly as streams tend to the ocean, have they been pouring the fruits of their labours, into their mother's lap. Good Heaven! and shall a total oblivion of former tenderneſſes and bleſſings, be

loſe by their unlimited trade with other foreign plantations, yet we are very great gainers by their direct trade to and from *Old England*. Our yearly exportations of *English* manufactures, malt and other goods, from hence thither, amounting, in my opinion, to ten times the value of what is imported from thence; which calculation I do not make at random, but upon mature conſideration, and, peradventure, upon as much experience in this very trade, as any other perſon, will pretend to; and therefore whenever reformation of our correſpondency in trade with that people ſhall be thought on, it will in my poor judgment, require *great tenderneſs* and *very ſerious circumſpection*.”

Sir *Joſiah Child*'s Diſcourſe on Trade.

“ Our plantations ſpend moſtly our *English* manufactures, and thoſe of all ſorts almoſt imaginable, in prodigious quantities, and employ near two thirds of all our *English* ſhipping; ſo that we have more people in *England*, by reaſon of our plantations in *America*.”

Idem.

Sir *Joſiah Child* ſays, in another part of his work, “ That not more than fifty families are maintained in *England* by the refining of ſugar.” From whence, and from what *Davenant* ſays, it is plain, that the advantages here ſaid to be derived from the Plantations by *England*, muſt be meant chiefly of the continental colonies.

“ I ſhall ſum up my whole remarks on our *American* colonies, with this obſervation, that as they are a certain annual revenue of ſeveral millions ſterling to their mother country, they ought carefully to be protected,

be spread over the minds of a good and wise nation, by the fordid arts of intriguing men, who covering their selfish projects under pretences of public good, first enrage their country into a frenzy of
 G passion,

protected, duly encouraged, and every opportunity that presents, improved for their increment and advantage, as every one they can possibly reap, must at last return to us with interest."

Beaver's Lex merc. red.

"We may safely advance, that our trade and navigation are greatly increased by our colonies, and that they really are a source of treasure and naval power to this kingdom, since they work for us, and their treasure centers here. Before their settlement, our manufactures were few, and those but indifferent; the number of *English* merchants very small, and the whole shipping of the nation much inferior to what now belongs to the northern colonies only. *These are certain facts.* But since their establishment, our condition has altered for the better, almost to a degree beyond credibility.—*Our manufactures* are prodigiously increased, chiefly by the demand for them in the plantations, where they *at least take off one half*, and supply us with many valuable commodities for exportation, which is as great an emolument to the mother kingdom, as to the plantations themselves,

Posslethwayt's univ. dict. of trade and commerce.

"Most of the nations of *Europe* have interfered with us, more or less, in divers of our staple manufactures, within half a century, not only in our woolen, but in our lead and tin manufactures, as well as our fisheries."

Posslethwayt, ibid.

"The inhabitants of our colonies, by carrying on a trade with their *foreign neighbours*, do not only occasion a greater quantity of the goods and merchan-

dizes

passion, and then advance their own influence and interest, by gratifying the passion, which they themselves have basely excited.

Hitherto *Great-Britain*, has been contented with her prosperity. Moderation has been the rule.

dizes of Europe being sent from hence to them, and a greater quantity of the product of America to be sent from them hither, which would otherwise be carried from and brought to Europe by foreigners, but an increase of the seamen and navigation in those parts, which is of great strength and security, as well as of great advantage to our plantations in general. And though some of our colonies are not only for preventing the importations of all goods of the same species they produce, but suffer particular planters to keep great runs of land in their possession uncultivated, with design to prevent new settlements, whereby they imagine the prices of their commodities may be affected; yet if it be considered, that the markets of Great-Britain depend on the markets of all Europe in general, and that the European markets in general depend on the proportion between the annual consumption and the whole quantity of each species annually produced by all nations; it must follow, that whether we or foreigners are the producers, carriers, importers and exporters of American produce, yet their respective prices in each colony (the difference of freight, customs and importations considered) will always bear proportion to the general consumption of the whole quantity of each sort, produced in all colonies, and in all parts, allowing only for the usual contingencies that trade and commerce, agriculture and manufactures are liable to in all countries."

Postlethwayt, ibid

"It is certain, that from the very time Sir *Walter Raleigh*, the father of our *English* colonies, and his associates,

rule of her conduct. But now, a generous, humane people, that so often has protected the liberty of *Strangers*, is inflamed into an attempt to tear a privilege from her own children, which if executed,

associates, first projected those establishments, there have been persons who have found an interest, in misrepresenting, or lessening the value of them.—The attempts were called chimerical and dangerous. Afterwards many malignant suggestions were made, about sacrificing so many *Englishmen* to the obstinate desire of settling colonies in countries which then produced very little advantage. But as these difficulties were gradually surmounted, those complaints vanished. No sooner were those lamentations over, but others arose in their stead; when it could be no longer said, that the colonies were useless, it was alledged that they were not useful enough to their mother country: That, while we were loaded with taxes, they were absolutely free; that the planters lived like princes, while the inhabitants of *England* laboured hard for a tolerable subsistence.” *Postlethwayt, ibid.*

“ Before the settlement of these colonies, “ says *Postlethwayt*, our manufactures were few, and those but indifferent. In those days we had not only our naval stores, but our ships from our neighbours. *Germany* furnished us with all things made of metal, even to nails. Wine, paper, linens, and a thousand other things, came from *France*. *Portugal* supplied us with sugar; all the products of *America* were poured into us from *Spain*; and the *Venetians* and *Genoese* retailed to us the commodities of the *East-Indies*, at their own price.”

If it be asked, whether foreigners, for what goods they take of us, do not pay on that consumption a great portion of our taxes? It is admitted they do.”

Postlethwayt's Great-Britain's true system.

“ If we are afraid that one day or other the colonies will revolt, and set up for themselves, as some seem

executed, must in their opinion, sink them into slaves: *And for what ?* For a pernicious power, not necessary to her, as her own experience may convince her, but horribly dreadful and detestable to them !

It

seem to apprehend, let us not drive them to a necessity to feel themselves independent of us; as they will do, the moment they perceive that they can be supplied with all things from within themselves, and do not need our assistance. If we would keep them still dependent upon their mother country, and in some respects *subservient* to her views and welfare; let us make it their *interest* always to be so."

Tucker on Trade.

" Our colonies, while they have *English* blood in their veins, and have relations in *England*, and while they can get by trading with us, the stronger and greater they grow, the more this crown and kingdom will get by them; and nothing but such an arbitrary power as shall make them desperate can bring them to rebel."

Davenant on the plantation trade.

" The northern colonies are not upon the same footing with those of the south; and having a worse soil to improve, they must find the recompence some other way, which only can be in property and dominion. Upon which score, any innovations in the form of government there, should be cautiously examined, for fear of entering upon measures, by which the industry of the inhabitants may be quite discouraged. 'Tis always *unfortunate* for a people, either by *consent* or upon compulsion, to depart from their *primitive institutions*, and those *fundamentals*, by which they were first united together. *Idem.*

The most effectual way of uniting the colonies, is to make it their common interest to oppose the designs and attempts of *Great-Britain*.

" All wise states will well consider how to preserve the advantages arising from colonies, and avoid the evils.

It seems extremely probable, that when cool, dispassionate posterity shall consider the affectionate intercourse, the reciprocal benefits, and the unsuspecting confidence, that have subsisted between

evils. And I conceive that there can be but *two* ways in nature to hinder them from throwing off their dependence; *one*, to keep it out of their *power*, and the *other*, out of their will. The *first* must be by *force*; and the *latter*, by *using them well*, and keeping them employed in such productions, and making such manufactures, as will support themselves and families comfortably, and *procure them wealth too*, and at least not prejudice their mother country.

Force can never be used effectually to answer the end, *without destroying the colonies themselves*. Liberty and encouragement are necessary to carry people thither, and to keep them together when they are there; and violence will hinder both. Any body of troops considerable enough to awe them, and keep them in subjection, under the direction too of a needy governor, often sent thither to make his fortune, at such a distance from any application for redress, will soon put an end to all planting, and leave the country to the soldiers alone; and if it did not; *would eat up all the profits of the colony*. For this reason, arbitrary countries have not been equally successful in planting colonies with free ones; and what they have done in that kind, has either been by force at a vast expence, or *by departing from the nature of their government, and giving such privileges to planters as were denied to their other subjects*. And I dare say, that a few prudent laws, and a little prudent conduct, would soon give us far the greatest share of the riches of all *America*, perhaps drive many of other nations out of it, or into our colonies for shelter.

There are *so many exigencies* in all states, *so many* — foreign wars, and domestic disturbances, that these colonies,

tween these colonies and their parent Country, for such a length of time, they will execrate with the bitterest curses the infamous memory of those men, whose pestilential ambition, unnecessarily, wantonly, first opened the sources of civil discord, between them; first turned their love into jealousy? and first taught these provinces, filled with grief and anxiety, to enquire.—

“ Mens ubi materna est ? ”

Where is maternal affection ?

A F A R M E R.

L E T T E R VI.

Beloved Countrymen,

IT may perhaps be objected against the arguments that have been offered to the public, concerning the legal power of the parliament, “that it has always exercised the power of imposing duties, for the purposes of raising a revenue on the productions of these colonies carried to *Great-Britain*, which may be called a tax on them.” To this objection

colonies *can never want opportunities*, if they watch for them, *to do what they shall find it their interest to do*; and therefore we ought to take all the precautions in our power, that it shall never be *their interest* to act against that of their native country; an evil which can be no otherwise averted, than by keeping them *fully employed* in such trades as *will increase their own*, as well as our wealth; for it is much to be feared, if we do not find employment for *them*, they may find it for us. The interest of the mother country, is always to keep them dependent, and so employed; and it requires, all her address to do it; and it is certainly more *easily and effectually* done by gentle and *insensible* methods, than by power alone.

Cato's letters.

objection I answer, that this is no violation of the rights of the colonies, it being implied in the relation between them and *Great-Britain*, that they should not carry such commodities to other nations, as should enable them to interfere with the mother country. The imposition of duties on these commodities, when brought to her, is only a consequence of her parental right; and if the point is thoroughly examined, the duties will be found to be laid on the people of the mother country. Whatever they are, they must proportionably raise the price of the goods, and consequently must be paid by the consumers. In this light they were considered by the parliament in the 25th *Charles II.* Chap. 7, Sect. 2. which says, that the productions of the plantations were carried from one to another free from all customs, "while the subjects of this your kingdom of *England* have paid *great customs and impositions for what of them have been spent here;*" &c.

Besides if *Great-Britain* exports these commodities again, the duties will injure her own trade, so that she cannot hurt us, without plainly and immediately hurting herself; and this is our check against her acting arbitrarily in this respect.

(a) It may be perhaps further objected, "that it

(a) If any one should observe that no opposition has been made to the legality of the 4th *Geo. III.* Chap. 15 which is the first act of parliament that ever imposed duties on the importations into *America* for the expressed purpose of raising a revenue there; I answer—First, that though the act expressly mentions the raising a revenue in *America*, yet it seems that it had as much in view the "improving and securing the trade between the same and *Great-Britain*," which words are part of its title: And the preamble

It being granted that statutes made for regulating trade, are binding upon us, it will be difficult for any persons, but the makers of the laws, to determine, which of them are made for the regulating of trade, and which for raising a revenue; and that from hence may arise confusion."

To

preamble says; "Whereas it is expedient that new provisions and regulations should be established for improving the revenue of this kingdom, and for extending and securing the navigation and commerce between *Great-Britain* and your Majesty's dominions in *America*, which by the peace have been so happily extended and enlarged," &c. Secondly. All the duties mentioned in that act are imposed solely on the productions and manufactures of foreign countries, and not a single duty laid on any production or manufacture of our mother country. Thirdly, The authority of the provincial assemblies, is not therein so plainly attacked as by the last act, which makes provision for defraying the charges of the "administration of justice," and the support of civil government." Fourthly, That it being doubtful, whether the intention of 4th *Geo. III*, Chap. 15, was not as much to regulate trade, as to raise a revenue, the minds of the people here were wholly engrossed by the terror of the Stamp-Act; then impending over them, about the intention of which there could be no doubt.

These reasons so far distinguish the 4th *Geo. III*. Chap. 15, from the last act, that it is not to be wondered at, that the first should have been submitted to, tho' the last should excite the most universal and spirited opposition. For this will be found, on the strictest examination, to be, in the principle on which it is founded, and in the consequences that must attend it, if possible, more destructive than the *Stamp-Act*. It is, to speak plainly, a prodigy in our laws; not having one *British* feature!

To this I answer, that the objection is of no force in the present case, or such as resemble it; because the act now in question, is formed *expressly for the sole purpose of raising a revenue.*

However, supposing the design of parliament had not been expressed, the objection seems to me of no weight, with regard to the influence which those who may make it, might expect it ought to have on the conduct of these colonies.

It is true, *that impositions for raising a revenue, may be hereafter called regulations of trade: But names will not change the nature of things. Indeed we ought firmly to believe, what is an undoubted truth, confirmed by the unhappy experience of many states heretofore free, that unless the most watchful attention be exerted, a new Servitude may be slipped upon us, under the sanction of usual and respectable terms.*

Thus the *Cæsars* ruined the *Roman* liberty, under the titles of tribunicial and dictatorial authorities, —old and venerable dignities, known in the most flourishing times of freedom. In imitation of the same policy, *James II.* when he meant to establish popery, talked of liberty of conscience, the most sacred of all liberties; and had thereby almost deceived the Dissenters into destruction.

All artful rulers, who strive to extend their power beyond its just limits, endeavour to give to their attempts as much semblance of legality as possible. Those who succeed them may venture to go a little further; for each new encroachment will be strengthened by a former- (b) “That which is now supported by examples, growing old, will become an example itself,” and thus support fresh usurpations.

H

A free

(b) *Tacitus.*

A free people therefore can never be too quick in observing, nor too firm in opposing the beginnings of *alteration* either in *form* or *reality*, respecting institutions formed for their security. The first leads to the last: Yet, on the other hand, nothing is more certain, than that the forms of liberty may be retained, when the substance is gone. In government, as well as in religion, "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." (c)

I will beg leave to enforce this remark by a few instances. The crown, by the constitution, has the prerogative of creating peers. The existence of that order, in due number and dignity, is essential to the constitution; and if the crown did not exercise that prerogative, the peerage must have long since decreased so much as to have lost its influence. Suppose a prince, for some unjust purposes, should, from time to time, advance so many needy, profligate wretches to that rank, that all the independence of the house of lords should be destroyed; there would then be a manifest violation of the constitution, *under the appearance of using legal prerogative.*

The house of commons claim the privilege of forming all money bills, and will not suffer either of the other branches of the legislature to add to, or alter them; contending, that their power simply extends to an acceptance or rejection of them. This privilege appears to be just. But under pretence of this just privilege, the house of commons has claimed a licence of tacking to money bills, clauses relating to things of a totally different kind, and thus forcing them in a manner on the king and lords. This seems to be an abuse of that privilege, and it may be vastly more abused.

Suppose

Suppose a future house, influenced by some discontented demagogues—in a time of danger, should tack to a money bill, something so injurious to the king and peers, that they would not assent to it, and yet the commons should obstinately insist on it; the whole kingdom would be exposed to ruin, *under the appearance of maintaining a valuable privilege.*

In these cases it might be difficult for a while to determine, whether the king intended to exercise his prerogative in a constitutional manner or not; or whether the commons insisted on their demand factiously, or for the public good: But surely the conduct of the crown, or of the house, would in time sufficiently explain itself.

Ought not the *people* therefore to watch? to observe facts? to search into causes? to investigate designs? And have they not a right of *judging* from the evidence before them, on no slighter points than their *liberty* and *happiness*? It would be less than trifling, wherever a *British* government is established, to make use of any arguments to prove such a right. It is sufficient to remind the reader of the day on the anniversary of which the first of these letters is dated. *

I will now apply what has been said to the present question.

The *nature* of any impositions laid by parliament on these colonies, must determine the *design* in laying them. It may not be easy in every instance to discover that design. Wherever it is doubtful, I think submission cannot be dangerous; nay, it must be right; for, in my opinion, there is no privilege these colonies claim, which they ought in duty and prudence more earnestly to maintain and defend, than the authority of the *British*

* November 5. The day King William the 3d landed.

British parliament to regulate the trade of all her dominions. Without this authority, the benefits she enjoys from our commerce, must be lost to her: The blessings we enjoy from our dependence upon her, must be lost to us. Her strength must decay; her glory vanish; and she cannot suffer, without our partaking in her misfortune. *Let us therefore cherish her interests as our own, and give her every thing, that it becomes Freemen to give or to receive.*

The nature of any impositions she may lay upon us may in general be known, by considering how far they relate to the preserving in due order the connection between the several parts of the *British* empire. One thing we may be assured of, which is this—Whenever she imposes duties on commodities, to be paid only upon their exportation from *Great-Britain* to these colonies, it is not a regulation of trade, but a design to raise a revenue upon us. Other instances may happen, which it may not be necessary at present to dwell on. I hope these colonies will never, to their latest existence, want understanding sufficient to discover the intentions of those who rule over them, nor the resolution necessary for asserting their interests. They will always have the same rights, that all free states have, of judging when their privileges are invaded, and of using all prudent measures for preserving them.

Quocirca vivite fortes

Fortiaque adversis opponite pectora rebus.

Wherefore keep up your spirits, and gallantly oppose this adverse course of affairs.

A F A R M E R.

LETTER VII.

My dear Countrymen,

THIS letter is intended more particularly for such of you, whose employments in life may have prevented your attending the consideration of some points that are of great and public importance : For many such persons there must be even in these colonies, where the inhabitants in general are more intelligent than any other people whatever, as has been remarked by strangers, and it seems with reason.

Some of you, perhaps, filled, as I know your breasts are, with loyalty to our most excellent Prince, and with love to our dear mother country, may feel yourselves inclined, by the affections of your hearts, to approve every action of those whom you so much venerate and esteem. A prejudice thus flowing from goodness of disposition, is amiable indeed. I wish it could be indulged without danger. Did I think this possible, the error should have been adopted, and not opposed by me. But in truth, all men are subject to the passions and frailties of nature ; and therefore whatever regard we entertain for the persons of those who govern us, we should always remember that their conduct, as rulers, may be influenced by human infirmities.

When any laws injurious to these colonies, are passed, we cannot, with the least propriety, suppose, that any injury was intended us by his Majesty, or the lords. For the assent of the crown and peers to laws, seems as far as I am able to judge, to have been vested in them, more for their own security, than for any other purpose. On the other hand, it is the particular business of

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the people, to enquire and discover what regulations are useful for themselves, and to digest and present them in the form of bills, to the other orders, to have them enacted into laws. Where these laws are to bind *themselves*, it may be expected, that the house of commons will very carefully consider them: But when they are making laws that are not designed to bind *themselves*, we cannot imagine that their deliberations will be as (a) cautious and scrupulous, as in their own case.

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(a) Many remarkable instances might be produced of the extraordinary inattention with which bills of great importance, concerning these colonies, have passed in parliament; which is owing, as it is supposed, to the bills being brought in by the persons who have points to carry, so artfully framed, that it is not easy for the members in general, in the haste of business, to discover their tendency.

The following instances shew the truth of this remark. When Mr. *Greenville*, in the violence of reformation, formed the 4th Geo. III. Chap. 15th, for regulating the *American* trade, the word "*Ireland*" was dropt in the clause relating to our iron and lumber, so that we could send these articles to no part of *Europe*, but to *Great-Britain*. This was so unreasonable a restriction, and so contrary to the sentiments of the legislature for many years before, that it is surprising it should not have been taken notice of in the house. However the bill passed into a law. But when the matter was explained, this restriction was taken off by a subsequent act. I cannot positively say how long after the taking off this restriction, as I have not the act, but I think, in less than 18 months, another act of parliament passed, in which the word "*Ireland*" was left out, just as it had been before. The matter being a second time explained was a second time regulated.

Now

I am told, that there is a wonderful address frequently used in carrying points in the house of commons, by persons experienced in these affairs. —That opportunities are watched—and sometimes votes are passed, that if all the members had been present, would have been rejected by a great majority. Certain it is, that when a powerful and artful

Now if it be considered, that the omission mentioned struck off with *one word so very great a part of our trade*, it must appear remarkable; and equally so is the method, by which *Rice* became an enumerated commodity, and therefore could be carried to *Great-Britain* only.

“ The enumeration was obtained (says Mr. [*] Gee) by one *Cole*, a Captain of a ship, employed by a company then trading to *Carolina*; for several ships going from *England* thither, and purchasing rice for *Portugal*, prevented the *aforesaid* Captain of a loading. Upon his coming home, he possessed one Mr. *Lowndes*, a member of parliament (who was very frequently employed to prepare bills) with an opinion, that carrying rice directly to *Portugal*, was a prejudice to the trade of *England*, and privately got a clause into an act, to make it an enumerated commodity; by which means he secured a freight to himself. But the consequence proved a vast loss to the nation.

I find that this clause, “ *privately got into an act,*” for the benefit of Captain *Cole*, to the “ *vast loss of the nation,*” is foisted into the 3d, and 4th *Ann*, Chap. 5th, intituled “ *An act for granting to her Majesty a further subsidy on wines and merchandizes imported,*” with which it has no more connection, than with 34th of *Edward* 1st. the 34 and 35 of *Henry* VIII. and the 25th *Charles* II. which provide that no person shall be taxed but by himself or his representative.

[*] Gee on trade, page 32.

artful man has determined on any measure against these colonies, he has always succeeded in his attempt. Perhaps therefore it will be proper for us, whenever any oppressive act affecting us is passed, to attribute it to the inattention of the members of the house of commons, and to the malevolence or ambition of some factious great man, rather than to any other cause.

Now I do verily believe, that the late act of parliament, imposing duties on paper, &c. was formed by Mr. *Greenville*, and his party, because it is evidently a part of that plan, by which he endeavoured to render himself popular at home; and I do also believe, that not one half of the members of the house of commons, even of those who heard it read, did perceive how destructive it was to *American* freedom. For this reason, as it is usual in *Great-Britain*, to consider the King's speech as the speech of the ministry, it may be right here to consider this act as the act of a party—perhaps I should speak more properly, if I was to use another term.

There are two ways of laying taxes. One is, by imposing a certain sum on particular kinds of property, to be paid by the user or consumer, or by rating the person at a certain sum. The other is, by imposing a certain sum on particular kinds of property to be paid by the seller.

When a man pays the first sort of tax, he knows with certainty that he pays so much money for a tax. The consideration for which he pays it, is remote, and, it may be, does not occur to him. He is sensible too, that he is commanded and obliged to pay it as a tax; and therefore people are apt to be displeased with this sort of tax.

The other sort of tax is submitted to in a very different manner. The purchaser of any article,
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very seldom reflects that the seller raises his price, so as to indemnify himself for the tax he has paid. He knows that the prices of things are continually fluctuating, and if he thinks about the tax, he thinks at the same time, in all probability, that he might have paid as much, if the article he buys had not been taxed. He gets something visible and agreeable for his money; and tax and price are so confounded together, that he cannot separate, or does not choose to take the trouble of separating them.

This mode of taxation therefore is the mode suited to arbitrary and oppressive governments. The love of liberty is so natural to the human heart, that unfeeling tyrants think themselves obliged to accommodate their schemes as much as they can to the appearance of justice and reason, and to deceive those whom they resolve to destroy, or oppress, by presenting to them a miserable picture of freedom, when the inestimable original is lost.

This policy did not escape the cruel and rapacious *Nero*. That monster apprehensive that his crimes might endanger his authority and life, thought proper to do some popular acts, to secure the obedience of his subjects. Among other things, says *Tacitus*," he remitted the twenty-fifth part of the price on the sale of slaves, but rather in shew than reality; for the seller being ordered to pay it, it became part of the price to the buyer." (b)

This is the reflection of the judicious *Historian*; but the deluded people gave their infamous Emperor full credit for his false generosity. Other nations have been treated in the same manner the *Romans* were. The honest, industrious *Germans*, who are settled in different parts of this continent,
can

(b) *Tacitus's Ann.* Book 13. S. 31.

can inform us, that it was this sort of tax that drove them from their native land to our woods, at that time the seats of perfect and undisturbed freedom.

Their Princes, enflamed by the lust of power, and the lust of avarice, two furies that the more they are gorged, the more hungry they grow, transgressed the bounds they ought, in regard to themselves, to have observed. To keep up the deception in the minds of subjects, "there must be, says (c) a very learned author," some proportion between the impost and the value of the commodity; wherefore there ought not to be an excessive duty upon merchandizes of little value. There are countries in which the duty exceeds seventeen or eighteen times the value of the commodity. In this case the Prince removes the illusion. His subjects plainly see they are dealt with in an unreasonable manner, which renders them most exquisitely sensible of their slavish situation." From hence it appears, that subjects may be ground down into misery by this sort of taxation as well as by the other. They will be as much impoverished, if their money is taken from them in this way as in the other; and that it will be taken, may be more evident, by attending to a few more considerations.

The merchant or importer, who pays the duty at first, will not consent to be so much money out of pocket. He therefore proportionably raises the price of his goods. It may then be said to be a contest between him and the person offering to buy, who shall lose the duty. This must be decided by the nature of the commodities, and the purchaser's demand for them. If they are mere luxuries,

(c) *Montesquieu's Spirit of laws*, Book 13. Chap. 8.

luxuries, he is at liberty to do as he pleases, and if he buys, he does it voluntarily: But if they are absolute necessities, or conveniencies, which use and custom have made requisite for the comfort of life, and which he is not permitted, by the power imposing the duty, to get elsewhere, there the seller has a plain advantage, and the buyer must pay the duty. In fact, the seller is nothing less than a collector of the tax for the power that imposed it. If these duties then are extended to the necessities and conveniences of life in general, and enormously increased, the people must at length become indeed "most exquisitely sensible of their slavish situation." Their happiness therefore entirely depends on the moderation of those who have authority to impose the duties.

I shall now apply these observations to the late act of parliament. Certain duties are thereby imposed on paper and glass, imported into these colonies. By the laws of *Great-Britain* we are prohibited to get these articles from any other part of the world. We cannot at present, nor for many years to come, though we should apply ourselves to these manufactures with the utmost industry, make enough ourselves for our own use.

That paper and glass are not only convenient, but absolutely necessary for us, I imagine very few will contend. Some perhaps, who think mankind grew wicked and luxurious, as soon as they found out another way of communicating their sentiments than by speech, and another way of dwelling than in caves, may advance so whimsical an opinion. But I presume no body will take the unnecessary trouble of refuting them.

From these remarks I think it evident, that we must use paper and glass; that what we use, must be *British*; and that we must pay the duties imposed

posed unless those who sell these articles, are so generous as to make us presents of the duties they pay.

Some persons may think this act of no consequence, because the duties are so small. A fatal error. That is the very circumstance most alarming to me. For I am convinced that the authors of this law would never have obtained an act to raise so trifling a sum as it must do, had they not intended by it to establish a precedent for future use. To console ourselves with the smallness of the duties, is to walk deliberately into the snare that is set for us, praising the neatness of the workmanship. Suppose the duties imposed by the late act could be paid by these distressed colonies with the utmost ease, and that the purposes to which they are to be applied, were the most reasonable and equitable that can be conceived, the contrary of which I hope to demonstrate before these letters are concluded; yet even in such a supposed case, these colonies ought to regard the act with abhorrence. For who are a free people? Not those, over whom Government is reasonably and equitably exercised, but those who live under a government so constitutionally checked and controuled, that proper provision is made against its being otherwise exercised.

The late act is founded on the destruction of this constitutional security. If the parliament have a right to lay a duty of four shillings and eight-pence on a hundred weight of glass, or a ream of paper, they have a right to lay a duty of any other sum on either. They may raise the duty, as the author before quoted says has been done in some countries, till it "exceeds seventeen or eighteen times the value of the commodity." In short, if they have a right to levy a tax of one
penny

benny upon us, they have a right to levy a million upon us: For where does their right stop? At any given number of pence, shillings or pounds? To attempt to limit their right, after granting it to exist at all, is as contrary to reason, as granting it to exist at all is contrary to justice. If they have any right to tax us—then, whether our own money shall continue in our own pockets or not, depends no longer on us, but on them. (a) “There is nothing which” “we can call our own; or, to use the words of Mr. Locke,—*what property have*” we “*in that, which another may, by right, take, when he pleases, to himself?*”

These duties which will inevitably be levied upon us—which are now levying upon us—are expressly laid for the sole purpose of taking money. This is the true definition of “taxes.” They are therefore taxes. This money is to be taken from us. We are therefore taxed. Those who are taxed without their own consent, given by themselves or their representatives, are slaves. We are taxed without our own consent, expressed by ourselves or our representatives. We are therefore—I speak it with grief—I speak it with indignation—we are (b) *Slaves!*

Miserabile vulgus.

A miserable tribe.

A F A R M E R.
LETTER.

(a) Lord Camden's speech.

(b) “It is my opinion, that this kingdom has no right to lay a tax upon the colonies.”——“The Americans are the Sons, not the Bastards of England.”——“The distinction between legislation and taxation is essentially necessary to liberty.”——“The commons of America, represented in their several assemblies, have ever been in possession of this their con-
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LETTER VIII.

My Dear Countrymen,

IN my opinion, a dangerous example is set in the last act relating to these colonies. The power of parliament to levy money upon us for raising a revenue, is therein avowed and exerted. Regarding the act on this single principle, I must again repeat, and I think it my duty to repeat, that to me it appears to be *unconstitutional*. No

stitutional right, of *giving and granting their own money*. They would have been *Slaves*, If they had not enjoyed it." "The idea of a virtual representation of *America* in this house, is the most contemptible idea, that ever entered into the head of man.— It does not deserve a serious refutation."

Mr. Pitt's speech on the *Stamp-Act*.

That great and excellent man, Lord Camden, maintains the same opinion. His speech in the house of peers, on the declaratory bill of the sovereignty of *Great-Britain*, over the colonies, has lately appeared in our papers. The following extracts so perfectly agree with, and confirm the sentiments avowed in these letters, that it is hoped the inserting them in this note will be excused.

"As the affair is of the utmost importance, and in its consequences may involve the fate of kingdoms. I took the strictest review of my arguments, I re-examined all my authorities; fully determined, if I found myself mistaken, publicly to own my mistake, and give up my opinion: But my searches have more and more convinced me, that the *British* parliament have no right to tax the *Americans*."—"No, is the doctrine new; it is as old as the constitution, it grew up with it; indeed it is its support."—"Taxation and representation are inseparably united God hath joined them: No *British* parliament can separate them; To endeavour to do it, is to stab our vitals."

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No man, who considers the conduct of the parliament since the repeal of the *Stamp-Act*, and the disposition of many people at home, can doubt, that the chief object of attention there, is, to use Mr. *Greenville's* expression, "providing that the *dependence and obedience* of the colonies be asserted and maintained."

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"My position is this—I repeat it—I will maintain it to my last hour—*taxation and representation* are inseparable—this position is founded on the laws of nature; it is more, it is itself *an eternal law of nature*; for whatever is a man's own, is absolutely his own; *no man hath a right to take it from him without his consent*, either expressed by himself or representative; whoever attempts to do it, attempts an injury; *whoever does it, commits a robbery*; he throws down the distinction between Liberty and Slavery."—"There is not a blade of grass, in the most obscure corner of the kingdom, which is not, which was not ever represented, since the constitution began: *There is not a blade of grass*, which when taxed was not taxed by the consent of the proprietor." "The forefathers of the *Americans* did not leave their native country, and subject themselves to every danger and distress, *to be reduced to a state of slavery*. They did not give up their rights: They looked for protection, and not for chains, from their mother country. By her they expected to be defended in the possession of their property, and not to be deprived of it: For should the present power continue, *there is nothing which they can call there own*; or, to use the words of Mr. *Locke*, "*what property have they in that, which another may by right, take when he pleases, to himself?*"

It is impossible to read this speech, and Mr. *Pitt's*, and not be charmed with the generous zeal for the rights of mankind that glows in every sentence. These
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Under the influence of this notion, instantly on repealing the *Stamp-Act*, an act passed, declaring the power of parliament to bind these colonies in all cases whatever. This however was only planting a barren tree, that cast a shade indeed over the colonies, but yielded no fruit. It being determined to enforce the authority on which the *Stamp-Act* was founded, the parliament having never renounced the right, as Mr. *Pitt* advised them to do; and it being thought proper to disguise that authority in such a manner, as not again to alarm the colonies; some little time was required to find a method, by which both these points should be united. At last the Ingenuity of Mr. *Greenville* and his party accomplished the matter, as it was thought, in "an act for granting certain duties in the *British* colonies and plantations in *America*, for allowing drawbacks, " &c. which is the title of the act laying duties on paper, &c.

The parliament having several times before imposed duties to be paid in *America*, it was expected, no doubt, that the repetition of such a measure would be passed over, as an usual thing. But to have done this, without expressly " asserting and maintain-
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great and good men, animated by the subject they speak upon, seem to rise above all the former glorious exertions of their abilities. A foreigner might be tempted to think they are *Americans*, asserting with all the ardour of patriotism, and all the anxiety of apprehension, the cause of their native land.—and not *Britons*, striving to stop their mistaken countrymen from oppressing others. Their reasoning is not only just—it is, as Mr. *Hume* says of the eloquence of *Demosthenes*, "vehement" It is disdain, anger, boldness, freedom, involved in a continual stream of argument."

ing" the power of parliament to take our money without our consent, and to apply it as they please, would not have been sufficiently declarative of its supremacy, not sufficiently depressive of *American* freedom.

Therefore it is, that in this memorable act we find it *expressly* " provided," that money shall be levied upon us without our consent, for *purposes*, that render it, *if possible*, more dreadful than the *Stamp-Act*.

That Act, alarming as it was, declared, the money thereby to be raised, should be applied " towards defraying the expences of defending, protecting and securing the *British* colonies and plantations in *America*." And it is evident from the whole act, that by the word "*British*," were intended colonies and plantations *settled by British* people, and not generally, *those subject to the British crown*. That act therefore seemed to have something gentle and kind in its intention, and to aim only at *our own welfare*: But the act now objected to, imposes duties upon the *British* colonies, " to defray the expences of defending, protecting and securing *his Majesty's dominions* in *America*."

What a change of words ! What an *incomputable* addition to the expences intended by the *Stamp-Act* ! "*His Majesty's dominions*" comprehend not only *the British colonies*, but also the *conquered provinces* of Canada and Florida, and the *British garrisons* of Nova-Scotia; for *these* do not deserve the name of *colonies*.

What justice is there in making us pay for " defending, protecting and securing" *these places* ? What benefit can we, or have we ever derived from them ? None of them was conquered for us ; nor will " be defended, protected or secured" for us.

In fact, however advantageous the subduing or
keeping

keeping any of these countries may be to *Great-Britain*, the acquisition is greatly injurious to these colonies. Our chief property consists in lands. These would have been of a much greater value, if such prodigious additions had not been made to the *British* territories on this continent. The natural increase of our own people, if confined within the colonies, would have raised the value still higher and higher every fifteen or twenty years: Besides, we should have lived more compactly together, and have been therefore more able to resist any enemy. But now the inhabitants will be thinly scattered over an immense region, as those who want settlements, will choose to make new ones, rather than pay great prices for old ones.

These are the consequences to the colonies, of the hearty assistance they gave to *Great-Britain* in the late war—a war undertaken solely for her own benefit. The objects of it were, the securing to herself the rich tracts of land on the back of these colonies, with the Indian trade; and *Nova-Scotia*, with the fishery. These and much more, have that kingdom gained;—but the inferior animals, that hunted with the lion, have been amply rewarded for all the sweat and blood their loyalty cost them, by the honour of having sweated and bled in such company.

I will not go so far as to say, that *Canada*, and *Nova-Scotia* are curbs on *New-England*; the chain of forts through the back woods, on the middle Provinces; and *Florida*, on the rest: But I will venture to say, that if the products of *Canada*, *Nova-Scotia*, and *Florida*, deserve any consideration, the two first of them are only rivals of our Northern Colonies, and the other of our Southern.

It has been said, that without the conquest of these countries, the colonies could not have been "protected, defended and secured:" If that is true, it may with as much propriety be said, that *Great-Britain* could not have been "defended, protected and secured, without that conquest: For the colonies are parts of her empire, which it as much concerns her as them to keep out of the hands of any other power.

But these colonies, when they were much weaker, defended themselves, before this conquest was made; and could again do it, against any that might properly be called their enemies. It *France* and *Spain* indeed should attack them, as members of the *British* empire, perhaps they might be distressed; but it would be in a *British* quarrel.

The largest account I have seen of the number of people in *Canada*, does not make them exceed 90,000. *Florida* can hardly be said to have any inhabitants. It is computed that there are in our colonies 3,000,000. Our force therefore must increase with a disproportion to the growth of their strength, that would render us very safe.

This being the state of the case, I cannot think it just that these colonies, labouring under so many misfortunes, should be loaded with taxes, to maintain countries, not only not useful, but hurtful to them. The support of *Canada* and *Florida* costs yearly, it is said, half a million sterling. From hence, we may make some guess of the load that is to be laid upon us; for we are not only to "defend protect and secure" them, but also to make "an adequate provision for defraying the charge of the administration of Justice, and the support of civil government, in such provinces where it shall be found necessary."

Not

Not one of the provinces of *Canada*, *Nova-Scotia*, or *Florida*, has ever defrayed these expences *within itself*: And if the duties imposed by the last statute are collected, all of them together, according to the best information I can get, will not pay one quarter as much as *Pennsylvania* alone. So that the *British* colonies are to be drained of the rewards of their labour, to cherish the scorching sands of *Florida*, and the icy rocks of *Canada* and *Nova-Scotia*, which never will return to us one farthing that we send to them.

Great-Britain——I mean the ministry in *Great-Britain*, has cantoned *Canada* and *Florida* out into *five* or *six* governments, and may form as many more. She now has *fourteen* or *fifteen* regiments on this continent; and may send over as many more. To make “an adequate provision” for all these expences, is, no doubt to be the inheritance of the colonies.

Can any man believe that the duties upon paper, &c. are the last that will be laid for these purposes? It is in vain to hope, that because it is imprudent to lay duties on the exportation of manufactures from a country to colonies, as it may promote manufactures among them, that this consideration will prevent such a measure.

Ambitious, artful men have made it popular, and whatever injustice or destruction will attend it in the opinion of the colonists, at home it will be thought just and salutary. (a)

The people of *Great-Britain* will been told, and

(a) “So credulous, as well as obstinate, are the people in believing every thing, which flatters their prevailing Passion.”

and have been told, that they are sinking under an immense debt—that great part of this debt has been contracted in defending the colonies—that these are so ungrateful and undutiful, that they will not contribute one mite to its payment—nor even to the support of the army now kept up for their “defence and security”—that they are rolling in wealth; and are of so bold and republican a spirit, that they are aiming at independence—that the only way to retain them in “obedience” is to keep a strict watch over them, and to draw off part of their riches in taxes—and that every burdén laid upon them; is taking off so much from *Great-Britain*.—These assertions will be generally believed; and the people will be persuaded that they cannot be too angry with their colonies, as that anger will be profitable to themselves.

In truth; *Great-Britain* alone receives any benefit from *Canada*, *Nova-Scotia* and *Florida*, and therefore she alone ought to maintain them. The old maxim of the law is drawn from reason and justice, and never could be more properly applied, than in this case.

Qui sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus;

They who feel the benefit, ought to feel the burden.

A F A R M E R.

LETTER IX.

My dear Countrymen,

I HAVE made some observations on the *purposes* for which money is to be levied upon us by the late act of parliament. I shall now offer to your consideration some further reflections on that subject: And, unless I am greatly mistaken, if these purposes are accomplished according to the

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expressed intention of the act, they will be found effectually to supersede that authority in our respective assemblies, which is essential to liberty. The question is not, whether some branches be lopped off—The axe is laid to the root of the tree; and the whole body must infallibly perish, if we remain idle spectators of the work.

No free people ever existed, or can ever exist, without keeping, to use a common, but strong expression, “the purse strings,” in their own hands. Where this is the case, they have a constitutional check upon the administration, which may thereby be brought into order without violence: But where such a power is not lodged in the people, oppression proceeds uncontrolled in its career, till the governed, transported into rage, seek redress in the midst of blood and confusion.

The elegant and ingenious Mr. *Hume*, speaking of the *Anglo-Norman* government, says—“Princes and Ministers were too ignorant, to be themselves sensible of the advantage attending an equitable administration, and there was no established council or assembly, *which could protect the people, and by withdrawing supplies, regularly and peaceably admonish the king of his duty, and ensure the execution of the laws.*”

Thus this great man, whose political reflections are so much admired, makes this power one of the foundations of *liberty*.

The *English* history abounds with instances, proving that this is the proper and successful way to obtain redress of grievances. How often have kings and ministers endeavoured to throw off this legal curb upon them, by attempting to raise money by a variety of inventions, under pretence of law, without having recourse to parliament? And how
often

often have they been brought to reason, and peaceably obliged to do justice, by the exertion of this constitutional authority of the people, vested in their representatives ?

The inhabitants of these colonies have, on numberless occasions, reaped the benefit of this authority lodged in their assemblies.

It has been for a long time, and now is, a constant instruction to all governors, to obtain a *permanent* support for the officers of government. But as the author of "the administration of the colonies" says, "this order of the crown is generally, if not universally, rejected by the legislatures of the colonies."

They perfectly know how much their grievances would be regarded, if they had no other method of engaging attention, than by complaining.—Those who rule, are extremely apt to think well of the constructions made by themselves in support of their own power. *These* are frequently erroneous, and pernicious to those they govern. Dry remonstrances to shew that such constructions are wrong and oppressive, carry very little weight with them, in the opinion of persons who gratify their own inclinations in making these constructions. They cannot understand the reasoning that opposes their power and desires. But let it be made their interest to understand such reasoning—and a wonderful light is instantly thrown upon the matter; and then rejected remonstrances become as clear as (a) "proofs of holy writ."

The three most important articles that our assemblies, or any legislatures can provide for, are, First—the defence of the society: Secondly—the

(a) *Shakespeare.*

the administration of justice: And thirdly—the support of civil government.

Nothing can properly regulate the expence of making provision for these occasions, but the necessities of the society; its abilities; the convenience of the modes of levying money among them; the manner in which the laws have been executed; and the conduct of the officers of government: All which are circumstances that cannot possibly be properly known, but by the society itself; or if they should be known, will not probably, be properly considered but by that society.

If money be raised upon us by others, without our consent, for our “defence,” those who are the judges in levying it, must also be the judges in applying it. Of consequence the money said to be taken from us for our defence, *may be employed* to our injury. We may be chained in by a line of fortifications—obliged to pay for the building and maintaining them—and be told, that they are for our defence. With what face can we dispute the fact, after having granted that those who apply the money, had a right to levy it? For surely it is much easier for their wisdom to understand how to apply it in the best manner, than how to levy it in the best manner. Besides the right levying is of infinitely more consequence, than that of applying. The people of *England*, would burst out into fury, if the crown should attempt to levy money by its own authority, has always assigned to the crown the application of money.

As to “the administration of justice”—judges ought, in a well regulated state, to be equally independent of the executive and legislative powers. Thus in *England*, judges hold their commissions

missions from the crown "*during good behaviour.*" and have salaries suitable to their dignity, settled on them by parliament. The purity of the courts of law since this establishment, is a proof of the wisdom with which it was made.

But in these colonies, how fruitless has been every attempt to have the judges appointed "*during good behaviour?*" Yet whoever considers the matter will soon perceive, *that such commissions* are beyond all comparison more necessary in these colonies, than they were in England.

The chief danger to the subject there, arose from the arbitrary *designs of the crown*; but here, the time may come, when we may have to contend with the *design of the crown, and of a mighty kingdom.* What then must be our chance, when the laws of life and death are to be spoken by judges totally dependent on *that crown, and that kingdom*--sent over perhaps from thence--filled with *British prejudices*--and backed by a standing army--supported out of our own pockets, to "*assert and maintain*" our own "*dependence and obedience.*"

But supposing that through the extreme lenity that will prevail in the government *through all future ages*, these colonies will never behold anything like the campaign of chief justice *Jefferies*, yet what innumerable acts of injustice may be committed, and how fatally may the principles of liberty be sapped, by a succession of judges *utterly independent of the people?* Before such judges, the supple wretches, who cheerfully join in avowing sentiments inconsistent with freedom, will always meet with smiles; while the honest and brave men, who disdain to sacrifice their native land to their own advantage, but on every occasion boldly vindicate her cause, will constantly be regarded

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with frowns. There are two other considerations relating to this head, that deserve the most serious attention.

By the late act, the officers of the customs are "empowered to enter into any house, warehouse, shop, cellar, or other place in the *British* colonies or plantations in *America*, to search for or seize prohibited or unaccustomed goods," &c. on writs granted by the superior or supreme court of justice having jurisdiction within such colony or plantation respectively.

If we only reflect, that the judges of these courts are to be *during pleasure*—that they are to have "*adequate provision*" made for them, which is to continue during their complaisant behaviour—that they may be strangers to these colonies—what an engine of oppression may this authority be in such hands?

I am well aware, that writs of this kind may be granted at home, under the seal of the court of exchequer: But I know also, that the greatest assenters of the rights of *Englishmen* have always strenuously contended, that such a power was dangerous to freedom, and expressly contrary to the common law, which ever regarded a man's house as his castle, or a place of perfect security.

If such a power was in the least degree dangerous there, it must be utterly destructive to liberty here. For the people there have two securities against the undue exercise of this power by the crown, which are wanting with us, if the late act takes place. In the first place, if any injustice is done there, the person injured may bring his action against the offender, and have it tried before *independent judges*, who are (a) *no parties in committing*

(a) The writs for searching houses in *England*, are to be

mitting the injury. Here he must have it tried before dependent judges, being the men who granted the writ.

To say, that the cause is to be tried by a jury, can never reconcile men who have any idea of freedom, to such a power. For we know, that sheriffs in almost every colony on this continent, are totally dependent on the crown; and packing of juries has been frequently practised even in the capital of the *British* empire. Even if juries are well inclined, we have too many instances of the influence of over-bearing unjust judges upon them. The brave and wise men who accomplished the revolution, thought the *independency of judges*, essential to freedom.

The other security which the people have at home, but which we shall want here in this,

If this power is abused there, the parliament, the grand resource of the oppressed people, is ready to afford relief. Redress of grievances must precede grants of money. But what regard can we expect to have paid to our assemblies, when they will not hold even the puny privilege of *French* parliaments—that of registering, before they are put in execution, the edicts that take away our money?

The second consideration above hinted at, is this, There is a confusion in our laws, that is quite unknown in *Great-Britain*. As this cannot be described in a more clear or exact manner, than has been done by the ingenious author of the history of *New-York*, I beg leave to use his words, 'The state of our laws opens a door to much controversy, The uncertainty with respect to them,

be granted "under the seal of the court of exchequer," according to the statute—and that seal is kept by the chancellor of the exchequer. 4th Inst. p. 104.

them, renders property precarious, and greatly exposes us to the arbitrary decision of bad judges. The common law of England is generally received, together with such statutes as were enacted before we had a legislature of our own; but our courts exercise a sovereign authority, in determining what parts of the common and statute law ought to be extended: For it must be admitted; that the difference of circumstances necessarily requires us, in some cases, to reject the determination of both. In many instances, they have also extended even acts of parliament, passed since we had a distinct legislature, which is greatly adding to our confusion. The practice of our courts is no less uncertain than the law. Some of the *English* rules are adopted, others rejected. Two things therefore seem to be absolutely necessary for the public security. First, the passing an act for settling the extent of the *English* laws. Secondly, that the courts ordain a general sett of rules for the regulation of the practice."

How easy it will be, under this "state of our laws," for an artful judge, to act in the most arbitrary manner, and yet cover his conduct under specious pretences; and how difficult it will be for the injured people to obtain relief, may be readily perceived. We may take a voyage of 3000 miles to complain; and after the trouble and hazard we have undergone, we may be told, that the collection of the revenue, and maintenance of the prerogative, must not be discouraged—and if the misbehaviour is so gross as to admit of no justification, it may be said, that it was an error of judgment only, arising from the confusion of our laws, and the zeal of the King's servants to do their duty.

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If the commissions of judges are *during the pleasure of the crown*, yet if their salaries are *during the pleasure of the people*, there will be some check upon their conduct. Few men will consent to draw on themselves the hatred and contempt of those among whom they live, for the empty honour of being judges. It is the sordid love of gain, that tempts men to turn their backs on virtue, and pay their homage where they ought not.

As to the third particular, "the support of civil government"—few words will be sufficient. Every man of the least understanding must know, that the executive powers may be exercised in a manner so disagreeable and harrassing to the people, that it is absolutely requisite, that they should be enabled, by the gentlest method which human policy has yet been ingenious enough to invent, that is, *by shutting their hands*, to "*admonish*" (as Mr. Hume says) "*certain persons of their duty.*"

What shall we now think when, upon looking into the late act, we find the assemblies of these provinces thereby stript of their authority *on these several heads*? The declared intention of the act is, "that a revenue should be raised in his Majesty's Dominions in America, for making a more certain and adequate provision for defraying the charge of the *administration of Justice*, and the support of *civil government* in such provinces where it shall be found necessary, and towards further defraying the expences of *defending, protecting and securing the said dominions.*"

Let the reader pause here one moment—and reflect—whether the colony in which he lives, has not made such "certain and adequate provision" *for these purposes* as is by the colony judged suitable to its abilities, and all other circumstances.—Then, let him reflect—whether if this act takes place,

place, money is not to be raised on that colony *without its consent*, to make "provision" for *those purposes*, which it does not judge to be suitable to its abilities, and all other circumstances. *Lastly*, let him reflect—whether the people of that country are not in a state of the most abject slavery, whose property may be taken from them under the notion of right, *when they have refused to give it.*

For my part I think I have good reason for vindicating the honour of the assemblies on this continent, by publicly asserting, that *they have made as "certain and adequate provision" for the purposes above mentioned, as they ought to have made*, and that it should not be presumed, that they will not do it hereafter. Why then should *these most important trusts* be wrested out of their hands? Why should they not now be permitted to enjoy that authority, which they have exercised from the first settlement of these colonies? Why should they be scandalized by this innovation, when their respective provinces are now, and will be for several years, labouring under loads of debt, imposed on them for the very purpose now spoken of? Why should all the inhabitants of these colonies be, with the utmost indignity, treated as a herd of despicable stupid wretches, so utterly void of common sense, that they will not even make "adequate provision" for the "administration of justice, and the support of civil government" among them, or for their own "defence"—though without such "provision" every people must inevitably be overwhelmed with anarchy and destruction? Is it possible to form an idea of a slavery more complete, more miserable, more disgraceful, than that of a people, where justice is administered, government exercised, and a standing army maintained, *at the expence of the people,*

le, and yet *without the least dependence upon them?* If we can find no relief from this infamous situation, let Mr. *Greenville* set his fertile fancy again at work, and as by one exertion of it he has stript us of our property and liberty, let him by another deprive us of our understanding; that, unconscious of what we have been or are, and ungoaded by tormenting reflections, we may bow down our necks, with all the stupid serenity of servitude, to any drudgery, which our lords and masters shall please to command.

When the charges of the "administration of justice," the "support of civil government," and the expences of "defending" "protecting and securing" us, are provided for, I should be glad to know, upon what occasions the crown will ever call our assemblies together. Some few of them may meet of their own accord, by virtue of their charters. But what will they have to do, when they are met? To what shadows will they be reduced? The men whose deliberations heretofore had influence on every matter relating to the *liberty and happiness* of themselves and their constituents, and whose authority in domestic affairs at least, might well be compared to that of Roman senators, will now find their deliberations of no more consequence, than those of constables. They may perhaps be allowed to make laws *for the yoking of hogs, or pounding of stray cattle.* Their influence will hardly be permitted to extend so high, as the keeping roads in repair, as that business may more properly be executed by those who receive the public cash. One most memorable example in history is so applicable to the point now insisted on, that it will form a just conclusion of the observations that have been made.

Spain was once free. Their Cortes resembled
our

our parliaments. No money could be raised on the subject, *without their consent*. One of their Kings having received a grant from them, to maintain a war against the *Moors*, desired, that if the sum which they had given, should not be sufficient, he might be allowed, for that emergency only, to raise more money without assembling the *Cortes*. The request was violently opposed by the best and wisest men in the assembly. It was, however, complied with by the votes of a majority; and this single concession was a precedent for other concessions of the like kind, until at last the crown obtained a general power of raising money, in cases of necessity. From that period the *Cortes* ceased to be useful,—the people ceased to be free.

Venienti occurrere morbo.

Oppose a disease at its beginning.

A F A R M E R.

LETTER X.

My dear Countrymen.

THE consequences, mentioned in the last letter, will not be the utmost limits of our misery and infamy, if the late act is acknowledged to be binding upon us. We feel too sensibly, that any ministerial measures (a) relating to these colonies, are

(a) *The gentleman must not wonder he was not contradicted, when, as minister, he asserted the right of parliament to tax America. I know not how it is, but there is a modesty in this house, which does not choose to contradict a minister. I wish gentlemen would get the better of this modesty. If they do not, perhaps the collective body may begin to abate of its respect for the representative."* Mr. Pitt's Speech.

are soon carried successfully through the parliament. Certain prejudices operate there so strongly against us, that it may be justly questioned, whether all the provinces united, will ever be able effectually to call to an account before the parliament, any minister who shall abuse the power by the late act given to the crown in *America*. He may divide the spoils torn from us in what manner he pleases, *and we shall have no way of making him responsible*. If he should order, that every governor shall have a yearly salary of 5000l. sterling; every *chief justice* of 3000l. every inferior officer in proportion; and should then reward the most profligate, ignorant, or needy dependents on himself or his friends, with places of the greatest trust, because they were of the greatest profit, this would be called an arrangement in consequence of the "adequate provision for defraying the charge of the administration of justice, and the support of civil government:" And if the taxes should prove at any time insufficient to answer all the expences of the numberless offices, which ministers may please to create, surely the house of commons will be so "modest" as not to "contradict a minister" who shall tell them, it is become necessary to lay a new tax upon the colonies, for the laudable purposes of defraying the charges of the "administration of justice, and support of civil government" among them. Thus, in fact, we shall be (b) taxed by ministers. In short, it will be

(b) "Within this act (*statute de tallagio non concedendo*) are all new offices erected with new fees, or old offices with new fees, for that is a tallage put upon the subject, which cannot be done without common assent by act of parliament. And this doth notably appear by a petition in parliament in anno 13. IV. where the commons complain, that an office

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be in their power to settle upon us any *civil, ecclesiastical, or military* establishment, which they choose.

We may perceive, by the example of *Ireland*, how eager ministers are to seize upon any settled revenue, and apply it in supporting their own power. Happy are the men, and *happy the people, who grow wise by the misfortunes of others*. Earnestly, my dear countrymen, do I beseech the Author of all good gifts, that you may grow wise in this manner; and if I may be allowed to take such a liberty, I beg leave to recommend to you in general as the best method of attaining this wisdom, diligently to study the histories of other countries. You will there find all the arts, that can possibly be practised by cunning rulers, or false patriots among yourselves, so fully delineated, that changing names, the account would serve for your own times.

It is pretty well known on this continent, that *Ireland* has, with a regular consistency of injustice, been cruelly treated by ministers in the article of *pensions*; but there are some alarming circumstances relating to that subject, which I wish to have better known among us.

(c) The revenue of the crown there, arises principally

was erected for measurage of cloths and canvas, with a new fee for the same, by colour of the king's letters patent, and pray that these letters patent may be revoked, for that the king could erect no offices with new fees to be taken of the people, who may not so be charged but by parliament." 2d *Inst.* p. 533.

(c) An enquiry into the legality of pensions on the *Irish* establishment, by *Alexander M'Auley, Esq*; one of the King's council, &c.

Mr. *M'Auley* concludes his piece in the following beautiful manner. "If any pensions have been obtained

principally from the Excise granted "*for pay of the army, and defraying other public charges, in defence and preservation of the kingdom*"—from the
tonnage

obtained on that establishment, to *serve the corrupt purpose of ambitious Men*.—If his Majesty's revenues of Ireland have been employed in pensions, to *debauch his Majesty's subjects* of both kingdoms. —If the treasure of Ireland has been expended in pensions, *for corrupting men of that kingdom to betray their country*; and men of the neighbouring kingdom, to betray both. —If *Irish* pensions have been procured, to *support gamesters and gaming-houses*; promoting a vice which threatens national ruin. —If pensions have been purloined out of the national treasure of Ireland, under the *mask of salaries annexed to public offices, useless to the nation*; *newly invented, for the purposes of corruption*. —If Ireland, just beginning to recover from the devastations of massacre and rebellion, be obstructed in the progress of her cure, by swarms of pensionary vultures preying on her vitals. —If, by squandering the national substance of Ireland, in a licentious, unbounded profusion of pensions, instead of employing it in nourishing and improving her infant agriculture, trade and manufactures, or in enlightening and reforming her poor, ignorant, deluded, miserable natives (by nature most amiable, most valuable, most worthy of public attention). —If, by such abuse of the national substance, sloth and nastiness, cold and hunger, nakedness and wretchedness, idleness, depopulation and barbarism, still maintain their ground; still deform a country, abounding with all the riches of nature, yet hitherto destined to beggary. —If such pensions be found on the *Irish* establishment; let such be cut off: And let the perfidious advisers be branded with indelible characters of public infamy; adequate, if possible, to the dishonour of their crime."

tonnage and additional poundage granted “ *for protecting the trade of the kingdom at sea, and augmenting the public revenue* ”——from the hearth money granted——as a “ *public revenue for public charges and expences.* ” There are some other branches of the revenue, concerning which there is not any *express* appropriation of them for public service, but which were plainly so intended.

Of *these* branches of the revenue the crown is only *trustee* for the public. They are unalienable. They are inapplicable to any other purposes, but those for which they were established; and therefore are not *legally* chargeable with pensions.

There is another kind of revenue, which is a private revenue. This is not limited to any public uses; but the crown has the same property in it, that any person has in his estate. This does not amount, at the most, to *Fifteen thousand Pounds* a year; probably not to *Seven*, and is the only revenue, that can be legally charged with pensions.

If ministers were accustomed to regard the rights or happiness of the people, the pensions in *Ireland* would not exceed the sum just mentioned. But long since have they exceeded that limit; and in *December 1765*, a motion was made in the house of commons in that kingdom, to address his Majesty on the great increase of pensions on the *Irish* establishment, amounting to the sum of *158,685l.*——in the last two years.

Attempts have been made to gloss over these gross encroachments, by this specious argument——“ That expending a competent part of the *public revenue* in pensions, from a principle of charity or generosity, adds to the dignity of the crown; and is therefore useful to the public.” To give it any weight, it must appear that the pensions

pensions proceed from "*charity or generosity only*"—and that it "adds to the dignity of the crown," *to act directly contrary to law.*—

From this conduct towards *Ireland*, in open violation of law, we may easily foresee what we may expect, when a minister will have the whole revenue of *America* in his own hands, to be disposed of at his own pleasure: For all the monies raised by the late act are to be "*applied by virtue of warrants under the sign manual, countersigned by the high treasurer, or any three of the commissioners of the treasury.*" The "*Residue*" indeed is to be "*paid into the receipt of the exchequer, and to be disposed of by parliament.*" So that a minister will have nothing to do, but to take care, that there shall be no "*residue,*" and he is superior to all controul.

Besides the burden of the pensions in *Ireland*, which have enormously increased within these few years, almost all the *offices* in that poor kingdom, have been since the commencement of the present century, and now are bestowed upon *strangers*. For though the merit of persons born there, justly raises them to places of high trust when they go abroad, as all *Europe* can witness, yet he is an uncommonly lucky *Irishman*, who can get a good post in his *native country*.

When I consider the (a) manner in which that
O island

(a) In *Charles* the second's time, the house of commons, influenced by some factious demagogues, were resolved to prohibit the importation of *Irish* cattle into *England*. Among other arguments in favour of *Ireland* it was insisted—"That by cutting off almost entirely the trade between the kingdoms, *all the natural bands of union were dissolved*, and nothing remained to keep the *Irish* in their duty, but force and violence."

island has been uniformly depressed for so many years past, with this pernicious particularity of their

“ The king (says Mr. *Hume*, in the history of *England*) was so convinced of the justness of these reasons, that he used all his interest to oppose the bill, and he openly declared, that he could not give his assent to it with a safe conscience. But the commons were resolute in their purpose.”——And the spirit of *tyranny*, of which *nations* are as susceptible as individuals, had animated the *English*, extremely to exert their superiority over their dependent state. No affair could be conducted with greater violence than this by the commons. They even went so far in the preamble of the bill, as to declare the importation of *Irish* cattle to be a nuisance. By this expression they gave scope to their passion, and at the same time barred the king's prerogative, by which he might think himself entitled to dispense with a law, so full of injustice and bad policy. The lords expunged the word, but as the king was sensible that no supply would be given by the commons, unless they were gratified in all their prejudices, he was obliged both to employ his interest with the peers, to make the bill pass, and to give the royal assent to it. He could not, however, forbear expressing his displeasure, at the jealousy entertained against him, and at the intention which the commons discovered, of retrenching his prerogative,

This law brought great distress for some time upon *Ireland*, but it has occasioned their applying with greater industry to manufactures, and has proved in the issue beneficial to that kingdom.

Perhaps the same reason occasioned the “ barring the king's prerogative” in the late act suspending the legislation of *New-York*.

This we may be assured of, that we are as dear to his Majesty, as the people of *Great-Britain* are.

We

their (b) parliament continuing as long as the crown pleases, I am astonished to observe such a love of liberty still animating that *loyal* and *generous* nation; and nothing can raise higher my idea of the *integrity* and (c) *public spirit* of a people,

We are his subjects as well as they, and as faithful subjects; and his Majesty has given too many, too constant proofs of his piety and virtue, for any man to think it possible, that such a prince can make any unjust distinction between such subjects. It makes no difference to his Majesty, whether supplies are raised in *Great-Britain*, or *America*; but it makes some difference to the commons of that kingdom.

To speak plainly as becomes an honest man on such important occasions, all our misfortunes are owing to a lust of power in men of abilities and influence. This prompts them to seek popularity by expedients profitable to themselves, though ever so destructive to their country.

Such is the accursed nature of lawless ambition, and yet—What heart but melts at the thought! —Such false, detestable patriots, in every nation, have led their blind, confiding country, shouting their applauses, into the jaws of shame and ruin. May the wisdom and goodness of the people of *Great-Britain*, save them from the usual fate of nations.

“———*mentem mortalia tangunt.*”

(b) The last *Irish* parliament continued 33 years, during all the late king's reign. The present parliament there has continued from the beginning of this reign, and probably will continue till this reign ends.

(c) I am informed that within these few years, a petition was presented to the house of commons, setting forth, “that herrings were imported into *Ireland* from some foreign parts of the north so cheap, as to discourage the *British* herring fishery, and therefore

ple, who have preserved the sacred fire of freedom from being extinguished, though the altar on which it burnt, has been overturned.

In the same manner shall we unquestionably be treated, as soon as the late taxes laid upon us, shall make posts in the "government," and the "administration of justice" here, worth the attention of persons of influence in *Great-Britain*. We know enough already to satisfy us of this truth. But this will not be the worst part of our case.

The *principals* in all great offices will reside in *England*, making some paltry allowance to deputies for doing the business *here*. Let any man consider what an exhausting drain this must be upon us, when ministers are possessed of the power of affixing what salaries they please to posts, and he must be convinced how destructive the late act will be. The injured kingdom lately mentioned,

therefore praying that some remedy might be applied in that behalf by parliament."——

That upon this petition, the house came to a resolution, to impose a duty of Two Shillings sterling on every barrel of foreign herrings imported into *Ireland*; but afterwards dropped the affair, for fear of engaging in a dispute with *Ireland* about the right of taxing her.

So much higher was the opinion, which the house entertained of the spirit of *Ireland*, than of that of these colonies.

I find, in the last *English* papers, that the resolution and firmness with which the people of *Ireland* have lately asserted their freedom, have been so alarming in *Great-Britain*, that the lord lieutenant in his speech on the 20th of last october, "recommended to that parliament, that such provision may be made for securing the judges in the enjoyment of their offices and appointments, *during their good behaviour*, as shall be thought most expedient."

ed, can tell us the mischiefs of *absentees*; and we may perceive already the same disposition taking place with us. The government of *New-York* has been exercised by a deputy. That of *Virginia* is now held so; and we know of a number of secretaryships, collectorships, and other offices held in the same manner.

True it is, that if the people of *Great-Britain* were not too much blinded by the passions, that have been artfully excited in their breasts, against their dutiful children the colonists, these considerations would be nearly as alarming to them as to us. The influence of the crown was thought by wise men, many years ago, too great, by reason of the multitude of pensions and places bestowed by it. These have been vastly increased since, (a) and perhaps it would be no difficult matter to prove that the people have decreased.

Surely

What an important concession is thus obtained, by making demands becoming freemen, with a courage and perseverance becoming freemen!

(a) One of the reasons urged by that great and honest statesman Sir *William Temple*, to *Charles* the Second, in his famous remonstrance, to dissuade him from aiming at arbitrary power, was, that the king "had few offices to bestow." *Hume's Hist. of England.*

"Tho' the wings of prerogative have been clipped, the influence of the crown is greater than ever it was in any period of our history. For when we consider in how many Boroughs the government has the votes at command, when we consider the vast body of persons employed in the collection of the revenue, in every part of the kingdom, the inconceivable number of placemen, and candidates for places in the customs, in the excise, in the post office, in the dock-yards, in the ordnance, in the salt office, in the stamps, in the navy and victualling offices,

Surely therefore, those who wish the welfare of their country, ought seriously to reflect, what may be the consequence of such a new creation of offices, in the disposal of the crown. The army, the administration of justice, and the civil government here, with such salaries as the crown shall please to annex, will extend ministerial influence as much beyond its former bounds, as the late war did the *British* dominions.

But whatever the people of *Great-Britain* may think on this occasion, I hope the people of these colonies will unanimously join in this sentiment, that the late act of parliament is injurious to their liberty, and that this sentiment will unite them in a firm opposition to it, in the same manner as the dread of the *Stamp-Act* did.

Some persons may imagine the sums to be raised by it, are but small, and therefore may be inclined to acquiesce under it. A conduct more dangerous to freedom, as before has been observed, can never

offices, and in a variety of other departments ; when we consider again the extensive influence of the money corporations, subscription jobbers and contractors, the endless dependencies created by the obligations conferred on the bulk of the gentlemen's families throughout the kingdom, who have relations preferred in our navy and numerous standing army ; when I say, we consider how wide, how binding a dependence on the crown is created by the above enumerated particulars, and the great, the enormous weight and influence which the crown derives from this extensive dependence upon its favour and power, any lord in waiting, any lord of the bedchamber, any man may be appointed minister."

A doctrine to this effect is said to have been the advice of L— H—, *Late News Paper.*

never be adopted. Nothing is wanted at home but a (b) *precedent*, the force of which shall be established, by the tacit submission of the colonies. With what zeal was the statute erecting the post-office, and another relating to the recovery of debts in *America*, urged and tortured, as *precedents* in the support of the *Stamp-Act*, tho' wholly inapplicable? If the parliament succeeds in this attempt, other statutes will impose other duties. Instead of taxing ourselves, as we have been accustomed to do, from the first settlement of these provinces, all our usual taxes will be converted into parliamentary taxes on our importations; and thus the parliament will levy upon us such sums of money as they choose to take, *without any other limitation*, than their pleasure.

We know how much labour and care have been bestowed by these colonies, in laying taxes in such a manner, that they should be most easy to the people, by being laid on the proper articles: most equal, by being proportioned to every man's circumstances; and cheapest, by the method directed for collecting them.

But *parliamentary taxes* will be laid on us, without any consideration, whether there is any easier mode. The only point regarded will be, the *certainty of levying the taxes*, and not the convenience

(b) Here may be observed, that when any ancient law or custom of parliament is broken, and the crown possessed of a *precedent*, how difficult a thing it is to restore the subject again to his *former freedom and Safety*." 2d Coke's *Inst.* p. 529.

"It is almost incredible to foresee, when any maxim or *fundamental law* of this realm is altered (as elsewhere hath been observed) what *dangerous inconveniences* do follow." 4th Coke's *Inst.* p. 41.

ence of the people on whom they are to be levied ; and therefore all statutes on this head will be such as will be most likely, according to the favourite phrase, " to execute themselves."

Taxes in every free state have been, and ought to be, as exactly *proportioned as is possible to the abilities of those who are to pay them*. They cannot otherwise be just. Even a *Hottentot* would comprehend the unreasonableness of making a poor man pay as much for " defending" the property of a rich man, as the rich man pays himself.

Let any person look into the late act of parliament, and he will immediately perceive, that the immense estates of Lord *Fairfax*, Lord (c) *Baltimore*, and our *Proprietaries*, which are amongst his Majesty's other "*Dominions*" to be " defended, protected and secured" by the act, will not pay a *single farthing* for the duties thereby imposed, except Lord *Fairfax* wants some of his windows glazed ; Lord *Baltimore* and our *Proprietaries* are quite secure, as they live in *England*.

I mention these particular cases, as striking instances how far the late act is a deviation from that principle of justice, which has so constantly distinguished our own laws on this continent, and ought to be regarded in all laws.

The third consideration with our continental assemblies in laying taxes, has been the method of collecting them. This has been done by a few officers,

(c) *Maryland* and *Pennsylvania* have been engaged in warmer disputes, in order to obtain an equal and just taxation of their proprietors' estates, but this late act of parliament does more for those proprietors, than they themselves would venture to demand. It *totally exempts* them from taxation—tho' their vast estates are to be " secured" by the taxes of other people.

officers, under the inspection of the respective assemblies, with moderate allowances. *No more was raised from the subject*, than was used for the intended purposes. But by the late act, a minister may appoint *as many officers as he pleases* for collecting the taxes; may assign them *what salaries he thinks* "adequate;" and they are subject to no inspection but his own.

In short, if the late act of parliament takes effect, these colonies must dwindle down into "*common corporations*," as their enemies in the debates concerning the repeal of the *Stamp-Act*, strenuously insisted they were; and it seems not improbable that some future historian may thus record our fall.

"The eighth year of this reign was distinguished by a *very memorable event*, the *American colonies* then submitting, for the *first time* to be *taxed* by the *British parliament*. An attempt of this kind had been made about two years before, but was defeated by the vigorous exertions of the several provinces, in defence of their liberties. Their behaviour on that occasion rendered their name very celebrated *for a short time* all over *Europe*; all states being extremely attentive to a dispute between *Great-Britain*, and so considerable a part of her dominions. For as she was thought to be grown too powerful, by the successful conclusion of the late war she had been engaged in, it was hoped by many, that as it had happened before to other kingdoms, civil discords would afford opportunities of revenging all the injuries supposed to be received from her. However the cause of dissention was removed, by a repeal of the statute that had given offence. This affair rendered the *submissive conduct* of the colonies so soon after, the more extraordinary; there being no difference
P between

between the mode of taxation which they opposed, and that to which they submitted, but this, that by the first, they were to be continually *reminded* that they were *taxed*, by certain marks *stamped* on every piece of paper or parchment they used. The authors of that statute triumphed greatly on this conduct of the colonies, and insisted, that if the people of *Great-Britain* had persisted in enforcing it, the *Americans* would have been in a few months, *so fatigued with the efforts of patriotism*, that they would quickly have yielded obedience.

“ certain it is, that tho’ they had before their eyes *so many illustrious examples* in their mother country, of the constant success attending *firmness* and *perseverance*, in opposition to dangerous encroachments on liberty, yet they quietly gave up a point of the *last importance*. From thence the decline of their freedom began, and its decay was extremely rapid; for as money was always raised upon them by the parliament, their *assemblies* grew immediately useless, and in a short time contemptible: And in less than one hundred years, the people sunk down into that tameness and supineness of spirit, by which they still continue to be distinguished.”

Et majores vestros & posteros cogitate.

Remember your ancestors and your posterity.

A F A R M E R.

LETTER XI.

My dear Countrymen,

I HAVE several times, in the course of these letters, mentioned the late act of parliament, as being the foundation of future measures injurious to these colonies; and the belief of this

this truth. I wish to prevail, because I think it necessary to our safety.

A perpetual jealousy, respecting liberty, is absolutely requisite in all free states. The very texture of their constitution, in mixed governments, demands it. For the cautions with which power is distributed among the several orders, imply, that each has that share which is proper for the general welfare, and therefore that any further acquisition must be pernicious. (a) *Machiavel* employs a whole Chapter in his discourses, to prove that a state, to be long lived, must be frequently corrected, and reduced to its first principles. But of all states that have existed, there never was any, in which this jealousy could be more proper than in these colonies. For the government here is not only mixt, but dependent, which circumstance occasions a peculiarity in its form, of a very delicate nature.

Two reasons induce me to desire, that this spirit of apprehension may be always kept up among us, in its utmost vigilance. The first is this—that as the happiness of these provinces indubitably consists in their connection with *Great-Britain*, any separation between them is less likely to be occasioned by civil discords, if every disgusting measure is opposed singly, and while it is new: For in this manner of proceeding, every such measure is most likely to be rectified. On the other hand, oppressions and dissatisfactions being permitted to accumulate—if ever the governed throw off the load, they will do more. A people does not reform with moderation. The rights of the subject therefore cannot be too often considered, explained, or asserted: And whoever attempts to do

(a) *Machiavel's discourses*—Book 3. chap. 1.

do this, shews himself, whatever may be the rash and peevish reflections of pretended wisdom, and pretended duty, a friend to those who injudiciously exercise their power, as well as to them, over whom it is so exercised.

Had all the points of prerogative claimed by *Charles* the first, been separately contested and settled in preceding reigns, his fate would in all probability have been very different; and the people would have been content with that liberty which is compatible with regal authority. But (*b*) he thought, it would be as dangerous for him to give up the powers which at any Time had been by usurpation exercised by the crown, as those that were legally vested in it. This produced an equal excess on the part of the people. For when their passions were excited by multiplied grievances, they thought it would be as dangerous for them to allow the powers that were legally vested in the crown, as those which at any time had been by usurpation exercised by it. Acts, that might, by themselves, have been upon many considerations excused or extenuated, derived a contagious malignancy and odium from other acts, with which they were connected. They were not regarded according to the simple force of each, but as parts of

(*b*) The author is sensible, that this is putting the gentlest construction on *Charles's*, conduct; and that is one reason why he chooses it. Allowance ought to be made for the errors of those men, who are acknowledged to have been possessed of many virtues. The education of this unhappy prince, and his confidence in men not so good or wise as himself, had probably filled him with mistaken notions of his own authority, and of the consequences, that would attend concessions of any kind, to a people, who were represented to him, as aiming at too much power.

these violations, *centering in few persons*, is to them considerable. For this reason the *governors* having in view their particular purposes, successively preserve an uniformity of conduct for attaining them. They regularly increase and multiply the first injuries, till at length the inattentive people are compelled to perceive the heaviness of their burthens.—They begin to complain and inquire—but too late. They find their oppressors so strengthened by success, and themselves so entangled in examples of express authority, on the part of their rulers, and of tacit recognition on their own part, that they are quite confounded: For millions entertain no other idea of the *legality* of power, than that it is founded on the *exercise* of power. They voluntarily fasten their chains, by adopting a pusillanimous *opinion*, “that there will be too much *danger* in attempting a remedy,”—or another *opinion*, no less fatal,—“that the government has a *right* to treat them as it does.” They then seek a wretched relief for their minds, by persuading themselves, that to yield their *obedience*, is to discharge their *duty*. The deplorable
poverty

always the *beginnings* of things, are never roused to exert themselves but by the last necessity: So that through *irresolution* and delay, when they would be glad to compound at last for their *quiet*, at the expence even of their *honour*; they commonly loose them *both*.”

Cicero's Orat. for Sextius.

Such were the sentiments of this great and excellent man, whose vast abilities, and the calamities of his country, during his time, enabled him, by mournful experience, to form a just judgment on the conduct of the friends and enemies of liberty.

poverty of spirit, that prostrates all the dignity bestowed by divine providence on our Nature—of course succeeds.

From these reflections I conclude, that every free state should incessantly watch, and instantly take alarm on any addition being made to the power exercised over them. Innumerable instances might be produced to shew, from what slight beginnings the most extensive consequences have flowed : But I shall select two only from the history of England.

Henry the seventh was the *first* monarch of that kingdom, who established a *standing body of armed men*. This was a band of *fifty* archers, called yeomen of the guard : And this institution, notwithstanding the smallness of the number, was, to prevent discontent, (f) “disguised under pretence of majesty and grandeur.” In 1684, the standing forces were so much augmented, that *Rapin* says, —“The king, in order to make his people *fully sensible of their new slavery*, affected to muster his troops, which amounted to 4000 well armed and disciplined men.” I think our army, at this time, consists of more than *seventy* regiments.

The method of taxing by *excise* was first introduced amidst the convulsions of the civil wars. Extreme necessity was pretended, and its short continuance promised. After the restoration, an excise upon *beer, ale, and other liquors*, was granted to the (g) king, one half in fee, the other for life, as an equivalent for the *court of wards*. Upon *James* the second's accession, the parliament (h) gave him the first *excise*, with an additional duty on

(f) *Rapin's History of England.*

(g) 12 Car. II. chap. 23 and 24.

(h) 1 James II. chap. 1 and 4.

on wine, tobacco, and some other things. Since the revolution, it has been extended to salt, candles, leather, hides, hops, soap, paper, paste-boards, mill-boards, scale-boards, vellum, parchment, starch, silks, callicoes, linens, stuffs, printed, stained, &c. ware, wrought plate, coffee, tea, chocolate, &c.

Thus a *standing army* and *excise*, have, from their first slender origins, tho' always *hated*, always *feared*, always *opposed*, at length swelled up to their vast present bulk.

These facts are sufficient to support what I have said. 'Tis true, that all the mischiefs apprehended by our ancestors from a *standing army* and *excise*, have not yet happened: But it does not follow from thence, that they *will not happen*. The inside of a house may catch fire, and the most valuable apartments be ruined, before the flames burst out. The question in these cases is not, what evil *has actually attended* particular measures—but what evil, in the nature of things, *is likely to amend* them. Certain circumstances may, for some time, delay effects, that *were reasonably expected*, and that *must ensue*. There was a long period, after the Romans had prorogued his command to *Q. Publius Philo*, (i) before that example destroyed their liberty.

(i) In the year of the city 428, *Duo singularia hæc ei viro primum contingere; prorogatio imperii non ante in ullo facta, et æsto honore triumphus*, Liv. b. 8. chap. 23, 26.

“ Had the rest of the Roman citizens imitated the example of *L. Quintius*, who refused to have his consulship continued to him, they had never admitted that custom of proroguing of magistrates and then the prolongation of their commands in the army had

liberty. All our kings, from the revolution, to the present reign, have been *foreigners*. Their *ministers* generally continued but a short time in authority; (k) and they themselves were *mild and virtuous* princes.

A *bold, ambitious* prince, possessed of *great abilities*, firmly fixed in his throne by *descent*, served by *ministers like himself*, and rendered either *venerable* or *terrible* by the *glory of his successes*, may execute what his predecessors did not dare to attempt. Henry the fourth tottered in his seat during his whole reign. Henry the fifth drew the strength of the kingdom into *France*, to carry on his wars there, and left the *commons* at home, protesting, "that the people were not bound to serve out of the realm."

It is true, that a strong spirit of liberty subsists at present in *Great-Britain*, but what reliance is to be placed in the *temper* of a people, when the prince is possessed of an unconstitutional power, our own history can sufficiently inform us. When Charles the second had strengthened himself by the return of the garrison of *Tangier*, England (says *Rapin*) saw on a sudden an *amazing resolution*; saw herself *stripped of all her rights and privileges*, excepting such as the king should vouchsafe to grant her: And what is *more astonishing*, the

had never been introduced, which very thing was at length the ruin of that common-wealth." *Machiavel's discourses*, b. 3. chap. 24.

(k) I don't know but it may be said, with a good deal of reason, that a quick rotation of ministers is very desirable in *Great-Britain*. A minister there has a vast store of materials to work with. *Long administrations* are rather favourable to the reputation of a people abroad, than to their liberty.

of a system of oppression.—Every one therefore, however small in itself, became alarming, as an additional evidence of tyrannical designs. It was in vain for prudent and moderate men to insist, that there was no necessity to abolish royalty. Nothing less than the utter destruction of monarchy, could satisfy those who *had* suffered, and thought they had reason to believe, they always *should* suffer under it.

The consequences of these mutual distrusts are well known : But there is no other people mentioned in history, that I recollect, who have been so constantly watchful of their liberty, and so successful in their struggles for it, as the *English*. This consideration leads me to the second reason, why I “ desire that the spirit of apprehension may be always kept up among us in its utmost vigilance.”

The first principles of government are to be looked for in human nature. Some of the best writers have asserted, and it seems with good reason, that “ government is founded on (c) *opinion*.”

Q

Custom

(c) “ *Opinion* is of two kinds, viz. *Opinion of interest*, and *opinion of right*. By *opinion of interest*, I chiefly understand, the sense of the public advantage which is reaped from government ; together with the persuasion, that the particular government which is established, is *equally advantageous* with any other, that could be easily settled.”

“ *Right* is of two kinds, right to power, and right to property. What prevalence opinion of the first kind has over mankind, may easily be understood, by observing the attachment which all nations have to their antient government and even to those names which have had the sanction of antiquity. Antiquity always begets the opinion of right.”——

“ it is sufficiently understood, that the opinion of right

Custom undoubtedly has a mighty force in producing *opinion*, and reigns in nothing more arbitrarily than in public affairs. It gradually reconciles us to objects, even of dread and detestation; and I cannot but think these lines of Mr. *Pope*. as applicable to vice in *politics*, as to vice in *ethics*.—

“ Vice is a monster of so horrid mein,
 “ As to be hated, needs but to be seen;
 “ Yet *seen too oft*, familiar with her face,
 “ We first *endure*, then *pity*, then *embrace*.”

When an act injurious to freedom has been *once* done, and the people *bear* it, the *repetition* of it is most likely to meet with *submission*. For as the *mischief* of the one was found to be tolerable, they will hope that of the second will prove so too; and they will not regard the *infamy* of the last, because they are stained with that of the first.

Indeed nations, in general, are not apt to *think* until they *feel*, and therefore nations in general have lost their liberty: For, as violations of the rights of the *governed*, are commonly not only (*d*) *specious*, but *small* at the beginning, they spread over the multitude in such a manner, as to touch individuals but slightly. Thus they are disregarded (*e*). The power or profit that arises from these

right to property, is of the greatest moment in all matters of government.” *Hume's Essays*.

(*d*) *Omnia mala exempla ex bonis initiis orta sunt,*
Sallust. Bell. Cat. S. 50.

(*e*) “ The republic is always attacked with greater vigour than it is defended: For the audacious and profligate, prompted by their natural enmity to it, are easily impelled to act by the least nod of their leaders: Whereas the honest, I know not why, are generally slow and unwilling to stir; and neglecting
 always

the *English* themselves *delivered up* these very rights and privileges to *Charles* the second, which they had so *passionately*, and, if I may say it, *furiouſly* defended against the designs of *Charles* the first." This happened only *thirty-six* years after this last prince had been beheaded.

Some persons are of opinion, that liberty is not violated, but by such *open* acts of force ; but they seem to be greatly mistaken. I could mention a period within these forty years, when almost as great a change of disposition was produced by the *secret* measures of a *long* administration, as by *Charles's* violence. Liberty, perhaps, is never exposed to so much danger as when the people believe there is the least ; for it may be subverted, and yet they not think so.

Public disgusting acts are seldom practised by the ambitious, at the beginning of their designs. Such conduct *silences* and *discourages* the weak, and the wicked, who would otherwise have been their *advocates* or *accomplices*. It is of great consequence, to allow those who, upon any account, are inclined to favour them, something specious to *say* in their defence. Their power may be fully established, tho' it would not be safe for them to do *whatever they please*. For there are things, which, at some times, even *slaves* will not bear. *Julius Caesar*, and *Oliver Cromwell*, did not dare to assume the title of *king*. The *Grand Signior* dares not lay a *new tax*. The king of *France* dares not be a *Protestant*. Certain popular points may be left untouched, and yet freedom be extinguished. The commonalty of *Venice* imagine themselves free, because they are permitted to do, what they ought not. But I quit a subject, that would lead me too far from my purpose.

By the late act of parliament, taxes are to be levied upon us, for "defraying the charge of the
administration

administration of justice—the support of civil government—and the expences of defending his Majesty's dominions in America."

If any man doubts what ought to be the conduct of these colonies on this occasion, I would ask him these questions.

Has not the parliament *expressly avowed* their intention of raising money from us for *certain purposes*? Is not this scheme *popular in Great-Britain*? Will the taxes, imposed by the late act, *answer those purposes*? If it will, must it not take an *immense sum* from us? If it will not, *is it to be expected*, that the parliament will not *fully execute* their intention, when it is pleasing at home, and *not opposed here*? Must not this be done by imposing *new taxes*? Will not every addition, thus made to our taxes, be an addition to the power of the *British* legislature, by increasing the number of officers employed in the collection? Will not every additional tax therefore render it *more difficult* to abrogate any of them? When a breach of revenue is once established, does it not appear to many people, *invidious and undutiful*, to attempt to abolish it? If taxes, sufficient to *accomplish the intention* of the parliament, are imposed by the parliament, *what taxes will remain* to be imposed by our assemblies? If *no material taxes remain* to be imposed by them, what must become of them, and the *people* they represent?

(1) "If any person considers these things, and yet thinks our liberties are in no danger, I wonder at that person's security."

One other argument is to be added, which, by itself, I hope will be sufficient to convince the most incredulous man on this continent, that the late
act

act of parliament is only designed to be a *precedent*, whereon the future vassalage of these colonies may be established.

Every duty thereby laid on articles of *British* manufacture, is laid on some commodity, upon the exportation of which from *Great-Britain*, a *drawback* is payable. Those *drawbacks*, in most of the articles, are *exactly double* to the duties given by the late act. The parliament therefore might in *half a dozen lines*, have raised *much more money*, only by *stopping the drawbacks* in the hands of the officers at home, on exportation to these colonies, than by this solemn imposition of taxes upon us, to be collected here. Probably, the artful contrivers of this act formed it in this manner, in order to reserve to themselves, in case of any objections being made to it, this specious pretence — “that the *drawbacks* are gifts to the colonies, and that the late act only lessens those gifts.” But the truth is, that the drawbacks are intended for the encouragement and promotion of *British* manufactures and commerce, and are allowed on exportation to any foreign parts, as well as on exportation to these provinces. Besides, care has been taken to slide into the act, (*m*) some articles in which there are no *drawbacks*. However, the whole duties laid by the late act on all the articles there specified, are so *small*, that they will not amount to so much as the *drawbacks* which are allowed on the rest of them only. If therefore, the sum to be obtained by the late act, had been the sole object in forming

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(*m*) Tho’ duties by the late act are laid on some articles, on which no drawbacks are allowed, yet the duties imposed by the act are so small, in comparison with the drawbacks that are allowed, that all the duties together will not amount to so much as the drawbacks.

forming it, there would not have been any occasion for the “the commons of Great-Britain to give and grant to his Majesty, rates and duties for raising a revenue in his Majesty’s dominions in America, for making a more certain and adequate provision for defraying the charges of the administration of justice, the support of civil government, and the expence of defending the said dominions;”——Nor would there have been any occasion for an (n) expensive board of commissioners, and all the other new charges to which we are made liable.

Upon the whole, for my part, I regard the late act as an *experiment made of our disposition*. It is a bird sent out over the waters, to discover whether

(n) The expence of this board, I am informed, is between four and five thousand pounds sterling a year. The establishment of officers, for collecting the revenue in *America*, amounted before, to seven thousand six hundred pounds *per annum*; and yet, says the author of the regulation of the colonies “the whole remittance from all the taxes in the colonies, at an average of thirty years, has not amounted to one thousand nine hundred pounds a year, and in that sum seven or eight hundred pounds *per annum* only, have been remitted from *North America*.”

The smallness of the revenue arising from the duties in *America*, demonstrates, that they were intended only as *regulations of trade*: And can any person be so blind to truth, so dull of apprehension in a matter of unspeakable importance to his country, as to imagine, that the board of commissioners lately established at such a charge, is instituted to assist in collecting one thousand nine hundred pounds a year, or the trifling duties imposed by the late act? Surely every man on this continent must perceive, that they are established for the care of a *new system of revenue*, which it but now begun.

ther the waves, that lately agitated this part of the world with such violence, are yet *subsided*. If *this adventurer* gets footing here, we shall soon be convinced, that it is not a *Phoenix*; for we shall quickly see it followed by *others of the same kind*. We shall find it rather to be of the (o) breed described by the poet.—

“ *Infelix vates.* ”

A direful foreteller of future calamities.

A F A R M E R.

LETTER XII.

Beloved Countrymen.

SOME states have lost their liberty by *particular accidents*: But this calamity is generally owing to the *decay of virtue*. A *people* is travelling fast to destruction, when *individuals* consider *their interests* as distinct from *those of the public*. Such notions are fatal to their country and to themselves, yet how many are there so weak and sordid as to think, they perform *all the offices of life*, if they earnestly endeavour to increase their own *wealth, power, and credit*, without the least regard for the society under the protection of which they live; who if they can make an *immediate profit to themselves*, by lending their assistance to those, whose projects plainly tend to the injury of their country, rejoice in their *dexterity*, and believe themselves entitled to the character of *able politicians*. Miserable men! of whom it is hard to say, whether they ought to be most the objects of *pity* or *contempt*; but whose opinions are certainly as *detestable*, as their practices are destructive.

Tho'

(o) “ *Dia calano,* ” &c. Virgil, *Æneid* 3.

Tho' I always reflect with a high pleasure on the integrity and understanding of my countrymen, which joined with a pure and humble devotion to the gracious author of every blessing they enjoy, will I hope, ensure to them and their posterity all temporal and eternal happiness, yet when I consider that in every age and country there have been bad men, my heart at this threatening period, is so full of apprehension, as not to permit me to believe, but that there may be some on this continent, *against whom you ought to be on your guard.*

Men who either (p) hold or expect to hold certain

(p) It is not intended, by these words, to throw any reflection upon gentlemen, because of their offices. For many of them are certainly men of virtue and lovers of their country. But supposed obligations of *gratitude* and *honour* may induce them to be silent. Whether these obligations *ought to be* regarded or not, is not so much to be considered by others, in the judgment they form of these gentlemen, as whether they think they ought to be regarded. Perhaps therefore we shall act in the properest manner towards them, if we neither *reproach* nor *imitate* them. The persons meant in this letter, are the *base spirited wretches*, who may endeavour to *distinguish themselves*, by their fordid zeal in defending and promoting measures, which they know beyond all question to be *destructive to the just rights and true interests* of their country. It is scarcely possible to speak of *these men*, with any degree of patience——It is scarcely possible to speak of them with any degree of propriety——For no words can truly describe their *guilt* and *meanness*——But, every honest bosom, on their being mentioned, will *feel* what cannot be *expressed*.

If their wickedness did not blind them, they might perceive

certain advantages, by setting examples of servility to their countrymen,—Men, who trained to the employment, or self taught by a natural versatility of genius, serve as decoys for drawing the innocent and unwary into snares. It is not to be doubted but that such men will diligently bestir themselves, on this and every like occasion, to

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spread

perceive along the coast of these colonies many skeletons of wretched ambition, who after *distinguishing themselves* in the support of the stamp-act, by a courageous contempt of their country and of justice, have been left to linger out their miserable existence, without a government, collectorship, secretaryship, or any other commissions, to console them as well as it could, for loss of virtue and reputation—while numberless offices have been bestowed in these colonies on people from *Great-Britain*, and new ones are continually invented, to be thus bestowed. As a few great prizes are put into a lottery to *tempt* multitudes to lose, so here and there an *American* has been raised to a good post—

“*Apparent rari nantes in gurgite vasto.*”

Mr. Grenville indeed, in order to recommend the stamp-act; had the *unequalled* generosity to pour down a golden shower of offices upon *Americans*; and yet these *ungrateful* colonies did not thank Mr. Grenville for shewing his kindness to their countrymen, nor *them* for accepting it. How must that great statesmen have been surprised, to find, that the unpolished colonists could not be reconciled to *infamy*—by *treachery*? Such a *bountiful* disposition towards us never appeared in any minister before him, and probably never will appear again: For it is *evident*, that such a system of policy is to be established on this continent, as in a short time, is to render it utterly unnecessary, to use the least art in order to conciliate our approbation of any measures.

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spread the infection of their meanness as far as they can. On the plans they have adopted, this is their course. *This* is the method to recommend themselves to their patrons. They act consistently, in a bad cause. They run well, in a mean race.

From them we shall learn, how *pleasant* and *profitable* a thing it is, to be for our *submissive* behaviour *well spoken of* at *St. James's* or *St. Stephens's*, at *Guildhall* or the *Royal Exchange*. Specious fallacies will then be dressed up with all the arts of delusion, to persuade one colony to *distinguish herself from another*, by unbecoming condescensions, *which will serve the ambitious purposes of great men at home*, and therefore will be thought by them *to entitle their assistance in obtaining them* to considerable rewards.

Our fears will be excited; our hopes will be awakened.

It will be insinuated to us with a plausible affectation of *wisdom* and *concern*, how *prudent* it is to please the *powerful*—how *dangerous* to provoke them—and then comes in the perpetual incantation that freezes up every generous purpose

Some of our countrymen may be employed to fix chains upon us, but they never will be permitted to hold them afterwards. So that the utmost, that any of them can expect, is only a temporary provision, that may expire in their own time, but which they may be assured, will preclude their children from having any consideration paid to them. *Natives of America* will sink into total neglect and contempt, the moment that their country loses the constitutional powers she now possesses. Most sincerely do I wish and pray, that every one of us may be convinced, of this great truth, that—*industry* and *integrity* are the paths of pleasantness," which lead to happiness

pose of the soul in cold inactive expectation—
 “ that if there is any request to be made, compliance will obtain a favourable attention.”

Our *vigilance* and our *union* are *success* and *safety*. Our *negligence* and our *division* are *distress* and *death*. They are *worse*—They are *shame* and *slavery*. Let us equally shun the benumbing stillness of *over weening sloth*, and the feverish activity of that *ill-informed zeal*, which busies itself in maintaining *little, mean and narrow* opinions. Let us with a truly wise *generosity* and *charity* banish and discourage all *illiberal distinctions*, which may arise from differences in situation, forms of *government*, or modes of *religion*. Let us consider ourselves as *men—freemen—christian freemen—separated from the rest of the world, and firmly bound together by the same rights, interests, and dangers*. Let these keep our attention inflexibly fixed on the *great objects*, which we must continually regard, in order to *preserve those rights, to promote those interests, and to avert those dangers*.

Let these *truths* be indelibly impressed on our minds—*That we cannot be happy without being free—that we cannot be free, without being secure in our property—that we cannot be secure in our property, if without our consent, others may, as by right, take it away—that taxes imposed upon us by parliament do thus take it away—that duties laid for the sole purpose of raising money, are taxes—that attempts to lay such duties should be instantly and firmly opposed—that this opposition can never be effectual, unless it is the united effort of these provinces—that therefore benevolence of temper towards each other, and unanimity of councils, are essential to the welfare of the whole—and lastly, that for this reason, every man amongst us, who in any manner would encourage*

courage either *dissention*, *diffidence*, or *indifference*, between these colonies, is an enemy to *himself* and to his *country*.

The belief of these truths, I verily think, my countrymen, is indispensably necessary to your happiness. I beseech you, therefore, (a) "teach them diligently unto your children, and talk of them when you sit in your houses, and when you walk by the way, and when you lie down, and when you rise up."

What have these colonies to ask, while they continue free? Or what have they to dread, but insidious attempts to subvert their freedom: Their *prosperity* does not depend on *ministerial favours* to particular provinces. They form one political body, of which *each colony* is a member. Their *happiness* is founded on *their constitution*; and is to be promoted, by preserving that constitution in unabated vigour, throughout every part. A spot, a speck of decay, however small the limb on which it appears, and however remote it may seem from the vitals should be alarming. We have *all the rights* requisite for our prosperity. The *legal authority* of *Great-Britain* may indeed lay hard restrictions upon us; but like the spear of *Telephus*, it will cure as well as wound. Her unkindness will instruct and compel us, after some time, to discover in our *industry and frugality*, surprising remedies,—if our rights continue unviolated. As long as the *products* of our labour, and the *rewards* of our care, can properly be called *our own*, so long it will be worth our while to be *industrious and frugal*. But if when we plow—sow—reap—gather and thresh, we find, that we plow,—sow—reap—gather—and—thresh *for others*, whose
pleasure

(a) Deuteron. vi. 7.

pleasure is to be the *sole limitation* how much they shall take, and how much they shall leave, *why* should we repeat the unprofitable toil? *horses* and *oxen*, are content with *that portion of the fruits of their work*, which their owners assign them, in order to keep them strong enough to raise successive crops, but even these beasts will not submit to draw for their masters until they are *subdued* with *whips* and *goads*. Let us take care of our rights, and we therein take care of *our property*. (b) "*Slavery is ever preceded by sleep.*" Individuals may be dependent on ministers if they please. *States should scorn it*—and if you are not wanting to yourselves, you will have a *proper regard* paid you by *those*, to whom if you are not *respectable*, you will be *contemptible*. But—if we have already forgot the reasons that urged us with *unexampled* unanimity to exert ourselves two years ago—if our zeal for the public good is *worn out* before the *homespun cloths*, which it caused us to have made—if our resolutions are so *faint*, as by our present conduct to *condemn* our own late *successful* example—if we are not affected by a reverence for the memory of our ancestors, who transmitted to us that freedom in which they had been blest—if we are not animated by any regard for posterity, to whom by the most sacred obligations we are bound to deliver down the invaluable inheritance. Then indeed, any *minister*—or any *tool* of a minister—or any *creature* of a *tool* of a minister—or any *lawyer* (a) *instrument of administration*,

(b) *Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws*—Bo. 14. ch. 13.

(a) "*Instrumenta regni*" Tacitus. Ann. Bo. 2. S. 66.

If any person shall imagine that he discovers in these

administration, if lower there be, is a *personage* whom it may be dangerous to offend.

I shall be extremely sorry if any man mistakes my meaning in any thing I have said. Officers employed by the crown are, while according to law they conduct themselves, entitled to legal obedience and sincere respect. These it is a duty to

these letters, the least disaffection towards our most excellent Sovereign, and the Parliament of Great-Britain, or dislike of the dependence of these colonies on that kingdom, I beg that such persons will not form any judgment on particular expressions, but will consider the tenor of all the letters taken together. In that case I flatter myself, that every unprejudiced reader will be convinced, that the true interests of Great-Britain are as dear to me, as they ought to be to every good subject.

If I am an *enthusiast* in any thing, it is in my zeal for the *perpetual dependence* of these colonies on their mother country—A dependence founded on mutual benefits; which can be continued only by *mutual affections*. Therefore it is, that with extreme apprehension I view the smallest seeds of discontent, which are unwarily scattered abroad. *Fifty* or *sixty* years will make astonishing alterations in these colonies; and this consideration should render it the business of *Great-Britain* more and more to cultivate our good dispositions towards her: But the misfortune is, that those *great men*, who are wrestling for power at home, think themselves very slightly interested in the prosperity of their country *fifty* or *sixty* years hence, but are deeply concerned in blowing up a popular clamour for supposed *immediate advantages*.

For my part, I regard *Great-Britain* as a bulwark happily fixed between these colonies and the powerful nations of *Europe*. That kingdom is our advanced post

to render them; and these no good or prudent person will withhold. But when those officers through rashness, or design, desire to enlarge their

post or fortification, which remaining safe, we under its protection enjoying peace, diffuse the blessings of religion, science and liberty thro' remote wildernesses. It is therefore incontestibly our *duty* and our *interest*, to support the strength of *Great-Britain*. When confiding in that strength, she begins to forget from whence it arose, it will be an easy thing to shew the source. She may readily be reminded of the loud alarm spread among her merchants and tradesmen, by the universal association of these colonies, at the time of the stamp-act, not to import any of her *manufactures*. In the year 1718, the *Russians* and *Swedes* entered into an agreement not to suffer *Great-Britain* to export any *naval stores* from their dominions but in *Russian* or *Swedish* Ships, and at their own prices. *Great-Britain* was distressed. *Pitch* and *tar* rose to *three pounds* a barrel. At length they thought of getting these article from the colonies; and the attempt succeeding, they fell down to *fifteen shillings*. In 1756, *Great-Britain* was threatened with an invasion, an easterly wind blowing for six weeks, she could not man her fleet, and the whole nation was thrown into the utmost consternation. The wind changed. The *American* ships arrived. The fleet sailed in ten or fifteen days. There are some other reflections on this subject, worthy of the most deliberate attention of the *British* parliament; but they are of such a nature, that I do not choose to mention them publickly, I thought that I discharged my duty to my country, by taking the liberty, in the year 1765, while the stamp-act was in suspense, of writing my sentiments to a man of the greatest influence at home, who, afterwards distinguished himself, by espousing our cause, in the debates concerning the repeal of that act.

their authority beyond its due limits, and expect improper concessions to be made to them, from regard for the employments they bear, their attempts should be considered as equal injuries to the crown and people, and should be courageously and constantly opposed. To suffer our ideas to be confounded by *names* on such occasions, would be an *inexcusable weakness*, and probably an *irremediable error*.

We have reason to believe, that several of his Majesty's present ministers are good men, and friends to our country; and it seems not unlikely, that by a particular concurrence of events, we have been treated a little more severely than they wished we should be. *They* might not think it prudent to stem a torrent. But what is the difference to us, whether arbitrary acts take their rise from ministers, or are permitted by them? Ought any point to be allowed to (b) a good minister, that should be denied to a bad one? The mortality of ministers is a very frail mortality. A—— may succeed a *Shelburne*—A—— may succeed a *Conway*.

We find a new kind of minister lately spoken of at home—*The minister of the house of commons*." The term seems to have peculiar propriety when referred to these colonies, *with a different meaning annexed to it*, from that in which it is taken there. By the word "minister" we may understand not only a *servant of the crown*, but a *man of influence* among the commons, who regard themselves as having a share in the *sovereignty* over us. The

"minister

(b) Ubi imperium ad ignaros aut minus bonus pervenit novum illud exemplum, abdignis & idoneis, ad indignos & non idoneos transfertur.

"minister of the house" may in a point respecting the colonies be so strong, that the minister of the crown *in the house*, if he is a distinct person, may not choose even where his sentiments are favourable to us, to come to a pitch'd battle upon our account. For though I have the highest opinion of the deference of the house for the King's minister, yet he may be so good natured, as not to put it to the test, except it be for the mere and immediate profit of his master or himself.

But whatever kind of minister he is; that attempts to innovate a *single jota* in the privileges of these colonies, him I hope you will *undauntedly oppose*; and that you will never suffer yourselves to be either *cheated or frightened* into any *unworthy obsequiousness*. On such emergencies you may surely, without presumption, *believe*, that *almighty God* himself will look down upon your righteous conduct, with gracious approbation. You will be a *Band of brothers*," cemented by the dearest ties, and strengthened with inconceivable supplies of force and constancy, by that sympathetic ardour, which animates good men, confederated in a good cause. Your *honour and welfare* are most intimately concerned; and besides *you are assigned by divine providence*, in the appointed order of things, *protectors of helpless unborn ages*, whose *fate* demands upon your *virtue*. Whether they shall be the *noble and indisputable heirs* of the richest trimonies, or the *dastardly and hereditary drudges* of imperious task-masters, *you must determine*. To discharge this double duty to *yourselves* and *your posterity*, you have nothing to do, but to set forth into use the *good sense and spirit* of which you are possess. You have nothing to do, but to conduct your affairs *peaceably—prudently—firmly—jointly*. By *these means* you will support the

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character

character of *free-men*, without losing that of *faithful subjects*—a good character in any government, one of the best under a *British* government.—You will prove that *Americans* have that true *magnanimity* of soul, that can resent injuries, without *falling into rage*; and that tho' your devotion to *Great-Britain* is the most affectionate, yet you can make *proper distinctions*, and know what you owe to *your selves*, as well as to *her*, You will at the same time that you advance your *interests*, advance your *reputation*—You will convince the world of the *justice of your demands*, and the *purity of your intentions*—While all mankind must with unceasing applauses confess, that you indeed *deserve liberty*, who so well *understand* it, so *passionately* love it, so *temperately* enjoy it, and so *wisely* bravely, and *virtuously* assert, maintain and defend it.

“ Certe ego libertatem, quæ mihi a parente meo tradita est, experiar: Verum id frustra a nobis ob rem faciam investra manu situm est. Quirites.


For my part, I am resolved strenuously to contend for the liberty delivered down to me by my ancestors; but whether I shall do it effectually or not, depends on you my countrymen.


“ How little soever one is able to write, when the *liberties* of one's country are threatened it is still more difficult to be silent.”

Is there not the probability, that if the universal sense of these colonies, is immediately expressed by *resolves* of the assemblies in support of the rights, by *instructions* to their agents on the subject and by *petitions* to the Crown and Parliament for redress, these measures will have the same success now, that they had in the time of the Stamp-act.

A F A R M E R.

F I N I S.





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